A/HRC/25/43 19. These recruitment practices did not help the Central African Armed Forces to coalesce into a single unit, and they were reorganized several times. They were also weakened by the internal divisions between Patassé and Bozizé supporters, after Bozizé was sacked as Chief of Staff under Patassé in 2001. 20. On coming to power, former President Bozizé too tried to control the security forces, though to a lesser extent, by favouring members of his own ethnic group, the Gbaya, within the Presidential Guard. 21. The army, gendarmerie and national police had similar problems, with, for example, an ageing and inadequate workforce and a lack of logistical resources and infrastructure.10 Their ability to respond to insecurity was also limited by the fact that they were deployed mainly in the capital.11 22. Taking advantage of the climate of impunity that prevailed under the successive regimes, the security forces committed many serious human rights violations, which were reported by the United Nations human rights protection mechanisms12 and international NGOs. 23. The ineffectiveness of the security forces has been a factor in the persistence of domestic threats such as national and foreign armed groups and highwaymen. It has also encouraged the formation of self-defence groups. 24. The attempt by Bozizé supporters to overthrow the Patassé regime on 25 October 2002 sparked a rebellion and was followed by several clashes between the Patassé and Bozizé forces, until Bozizé seized power on 15 March 2003. 25. After Bozizé’s election as President of the Republic in 2005, various rebel movements sprang up. The Armée Populaire pour la Restauration de la République et de la Démocratie (APRD), made up of members of Patassé’s old Presidential Guard and village self-defence committees, established itself in the north-west, former President Patassé’s region, and in the northern central area. In Ouham prefecture (northern-central region), a military figure close to former President Patassé, Abdoulaye Miskine, formed the Front Démocratique du Peuple Centrafricain (FDPC). 26. In September 2006, a rebel movement, the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement (UFDR), emerged in the north-east (Vakaga and Haute-Kotto prefectures); this was formed from three groups, the Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice, (MLCJ)13 the Groupe d’Action Patriotique de Libération de la Centrafrique (GAPLC) and the Front Démocratique Centrafricain (FDC). In 2008 another rebel movement, the Convention des Patriotes pour la Justice et la Paix (CPJP), established itself in the north-east of the country (Bamingui-Bangoran prefecture). 27. The former Séléka, which took power in March 2013, is a diverse coalition of armed groups whose members are apparently predominantly Muslim. It comprises various armed groups such as UFDR and CPJP, less well-known ones such as the Union des Forces 10 11 12 13 6 M. Martineau Bria, S. I. Maradas-Nado, “Rapport général du séminaire national sur la réforme du secteur de sécurité en République centrafricaine, 14–17 Avril 2008”, Bangui, Ministry of Defence, ex-Combatants, War Victims, Disarmament, and Restructuring of the Army, Central African Republic, 2008, p. 5. Ibid, p. 6. In 2008, the Human Rights Council Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions noted in his report that the situation had improved,although “up until very recently, Government forces were burning entire villages to the ground and summarily executing large numbers of people”, A/HRC/8/3/Add.5, paras. 3 and 5. The Mouvement des Libérateurs Centrafricains pour la Justice remained a part of the Union des Forces Démocratiques pour le Rassemblement until 2008. GE.14-11122