A/HRC/35/22 Cameroon, 16 the Gambia, 17 India, 18 Myanmar, 19 the Islamic Republic of Iran, 20 Uganda 21 and Montenegro.22 12. The failure to explain or acknowledge shutdowns creates the perception that they are designed to suppress reporting, criticism or dissent. Reports of repression and Statesanctioned violence in the wake of network disruptions have led to allegations that some States exploit the darkness to commit and cover up abuses. In Sudan, for example, Internet access was shut down for several hours during a deadly crackdown on demonstrators protesting fuel price hikes in September 2013.23 13. Observers have also noted the growing use of shutdowns to prevent cheating by students during national exams. Uzbekistan may have been the first to invoke this justification during university entrance exams in 2014. 24 In 2016, authorities allegedly ordered shutdowns during exams in India, Algeria, Ethiopia and Iraq. 25 14. Network shutdowns invariably fail to meet the standard of necessity. Necessity requires a showing that shutdowns would achieve their stated purpose, which in fact they often jeopardize. Some governments argue that it is important to ban the spread of news about terrorist attacks, even accurate reporting, in order to prevent panic and copycat actions.26 Yet it has been found that maintaining network connectivity may mitigate public safety concerns and help restore public order. During public disturbances in London in 2011, for example, authorities used social media networks to identify perpetrators, disseminate accurate information and conduct clean-up operations. In Kashmir, police have reported on the positive role of mobile phones in locating people trapped during terrorist attacks. 27 15. Duration and geographical scope may vary, but shutdowns are generally disproportionate. Affected users are cut off from emergency services and health information, mobile banking and e-commerce, transportation, school classes, voting and election monitoring, reporting on major crises and events, and human rights investigations. 28 Given the number of essential activities and services they affect, shutdowns restrict expression and interfere with other fundamental rights. 16. Shutdowns also affect areas beyond those of specific concern. 29 In the lead up to the 2015 National Day Parade in Pakistan, mobile communications networks were allegedly cut off at the parade site as well as in surrounding areas that were not expected to experience any potential security threat.30 During the Pope’s visit to the Philippines in 2015, the shutdown of mobile networks for safety reasons affected areas well beyond the travel 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 6 OHCHR, “UN expert urges Cameroon to restore Internet services cut off in rights violation”, press release (10 February 2017). Deji Olukotun, “Gambia shuts down Internet on eve of elections”, Access Now (30 November 2016). Software Freedom Law Center, “Internet shutdowns in India, 2013-2016”. Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net: Myanmar” (2011). Center for Democracy and Technology, “Iran’s Internet throttling: unacceptable now, unacceptable then” (3 July 2013). Article 19, “Uganda: Blanket ban on social media on election day is disproportionate” press release (18 February 2016). Global Voices, “WhatsApp and Viber blocked on election day in Montenegro” (17 October 2016). Human Rights Watch, “Sudan: Dozens killed during protests” (27 September 2013). Access Now submission, part I; also Freedom House, “Freedom on the Net: Uzbekistan” (2016). Access Now submission, part I. See for example, OHCHR, “Preliminary conclusions and observations by the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to freedom of opinion and expression to his visit to Turkey, 14-18 November 2016”, press release (18 November 2016). Institute for Human Rights and Business (IHRB), “Security v. Access: The impact of mobile network shutdowns”, case study: Telenor Pakistan (September 2015), pp. 31-32. Access Now submission, part I, pp. 11-14; also Global Network Initiative submission. IHRB, “Security v. Access: The impact of mobile network shutdowns”, case study: Telenor Pakistan (September 2015), p. 20. Ibid., pp. 27-28.