A/HRC/24/42 • Publicly expressed differences and, indeed, discord, among commissioners over fundamental issues concerning a commission’s operation and conclusions. • Abiding critiques about poor implementation of commission recommendations. • A worrisome trend towards the seemingly open-ended expansion of commission mandates, not just thematically, but functionally, leading to doubts about whether there is any institution encompassing all the competencies required by such expansion. 31. In highlighting these challenges, the Special Rapporteur intends to contribute to maintaining the integrity of commissions and strengthening their efficacy, given past experiences which demonstrate that they can be useful, and at times key, transitional instruments. B. Ex ante challenges 1. Mandates 32. The greatest challenge currently facing truth commissions concerns the expansion of their mandates. By a “mandate”, the Special Rapporteur refers to the foundational document, taking the form of an executive decree, a legislative act, a peace agreement, or a United Nations regulation. Foundational documents typically define (a) the duration of a commission’s operation; (b) the temporal scope of the mandate defining the period in which the violations must have occurred to be under the commission’s purview; (c) the thematic mandate - the types of violations that the commission is authorized and/or obligated to address; (d) the commission’s functions - the actions it is supposed to undertake; and (e) the objectives or ends the commission is requested to fulfil.28 The Special Rapporteur will use this classification for analytical purposes and to call attention to some trends.29 33. Duration. The period assigned to truth commissions to complete their tasks has expanded, albeit within limits. Illustrative is that truth commissions of the 1980s and 1990s, with the exception of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, tended to last one year or less.30 Commissions of the past decade have tended to last over one year and up to three years.31 Experience has shown that performing such complex tasks in only a few months is unfeasible. At the same time, prolonging indefinitely the lifespan of a commission is also unfeasible, as it would diminish the commission’s function of signalling in a timely fashion the break with past abusive practices. 28 29 30 31 Mandates frequently include other elements, such as the specifications of the powers of the commission (e.g., subpoena, search and seizure), selection and appointment procedures, or the names of appointees. Hastening to add that as tendencies, “outliers” can be identified regarding most of them, and that the rate and even the direction of expansion are often not linear. Argentina (9 months); Chile (6 months with a possible 3-month extension); El Salvador (6 months); Guatemala (6 months with a possible 6-month extension). South Africa (24 months with a 3-month extension). Sierra Leone (3 months preparatory period, 12 months of operation with possible 6-month extension); Peru (3-month preparatory period extended one month, 18-month duration, 5-month extension); Timor-Leste (2-month preparatory period, 2 years of operation with a possible 6-month extension); Liberia (3-month preparatory period, 2 years of operations, a 3-month wrap-up period, and a possible 3-month extension); Kenya (3-month preparatory period, 2 years of operation, 6-month extension). See Hayner (fn 21), pp. 268-273 and corresponding mandates. 9