A/HRC/43/45/Add.1 between 2006 and 2014,4 which underpinned the Government’s success in achieving macroeconomic stability.5 Furthermore, the increased revenue was directly channelled to public investments and social programmes. The Government steadily increased social spending by approximately 10 per cent annually between 2006 and 2017,6 which included public investments in education, health, and infrastructure such as roads, electricity, water and sanitation facilities. It encouraged a flow of private capital to the social sector by requiring that private banks spend a minimum of 60 per cent of their portfolio on loans to the social housing and production sectors, with the latter representing at least 25 per cent of the total portfolio.7 The interest rates for such loans are capped at 5.5 to 6.5 per cent for social housing,8 and at 6 to 11.5 per cent for the production sector.9 This policy has also benefited the financial sector, in which total credit has significantly grown, at an average of 16 per cent per year since 2008,10 and which gained $1.6 billion from 2013 to 2018. 6. A number of conditional and universal cash transfer programmes, such as the Renta Dignidad (“dignity” pension), the Juancito Pinto grant and the Juana Azurduy grant, were introduced between 2006 and 2009. These programmes were designed to improve the living conditions of certain groups in vulnerable situations, such as older persons, children, and pregnant women and mothers. The Government has also consistently raised the minimum wage above inflation. The minimum wage grew from 440 bolivianos per month in 2006 to 2,122 bolivianos per month in 2019,11 and in real terms, it increased by 153 per cent from 2000 to 2019.12 This also had an effect of raising real labour income, not only in the formal sector, but also in the informal sector.13 In addition, the Government in 2018 provided a second annual bonus for workers, as the target of achieving annual economic growth of at least 4.5 per cent had been met. Although the redistributive impact of the second bonus has not been empirically analysed, the increase in labour income has contributed to enhancing the purchasing power of the population, stimulated domestic demand and boosted household consumption, which was another key driver of the economic growth. It has been also shown that the increase in labour income, particularly among the poorest 40 per cent of households, has significantly contributed to a reduction in poverty and inequality. 14 7. In 2014, the Government’s revenue matrix came under threat, with a sudden plummet in the international oil and gas prices. As an economy that heavily relied on export of natural resources for its revenue stream, the State faced increasing challenges in sustaining the level of fiscal revenue and, correlatively, the public investment rhythm. However, instead of resorting to austerity, as the mainstream neoliberal dogma may 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 4 Nelson Chacón and Horacio Valencia, “Combating poverty with efficiency: the new role of social transfers in Bolivia in a less favourable context”, in Growth, Inequality and the Challenge for Sustainability in a Post-boom Scenario in the Andean Region, Bettina Schorr, Gerardo Hector Damonte Valencia and Iván Omar Velásquez-Castellanos, eds. (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, La Paz, 2018), pp. 106–107. Andrés Arauz and others, “Bolivia’s economic transformation: macroeconomic policies, institutional changes, and results”, Center for Economic and Policy Research, October 2019, p. 8. International Monetary Fund (IMF), “Bolivia: 2018 article IV consultation – press release and staff report” December 2018, p. 14. Supreme Decree No. 1842 (18 December 2013), art. 4. Ibid., art. 3. Supreme Decree No. 2055 (10 July 2014), art. 5. Arauz and others, “Bolivia’s economic transformation”, p. 12. Ministry of Economy and Public Finance, “Incremento salarial llegará al sector público pero no beneficiará al Presidente, Vicepresidente, ministros, viceministros y directores generales”, 1 May 2019. Comments of the Ministry of Economy and Public Finance on the draft report of the Independent Expert on his visit to Bolivia (28 November 2019) (on file). Jose P. Mauricio Vargas and Santiago Garriga, “Explaining inequality and poverty reduction in Bolivia”, IMF Working Paper, No. WP/15/265 (Washington, D.C., IMF, 2015), p. 22. Verónica Paz Arauco, “Brechas de género y política tributaria en Bolivia: apuntes para un debate”, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, July 2018, p. 4.