A/HRC/39/63 54. In 2017 and 2018, freedom of movement was also hampered by roadblocks throughout the country and checkpoints at the entrance to markets. Imbonerakure, sometimes in collaboration with local governments, turned away persons who could not show evidence that they had registered for the referendum or that they had paid contributions for the 2020 elections or other levies. D. Violations of economic and social rights 55. Political crises in Burundi have long had a direct impact on the enjoyment of economic and social rights. The Arusha Agreement identifies the failure to satisfy the basic needs of citizens as one of the causes of violence in Burundi.14 The crisis that broke out in 2015 was no exception. In 2016, Burundi went from a developing country to a country in a state of humanitarian emergency.15 The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the African Development Bank have all recorded zero or negative economic growth in Burundi since 2015. This reversal is taking place in a country where growth is structurally “low and volatile” 16 owing to a lack of diversification of the economy, which is based primarily on an agricultural sector that is dominated by subsistence activities and dependent on the vagaries of exports and weather. 56. IMF noted that the country’s growth prospects for 2018 would remain weak owing to internal conflicts, political constraints and governance and security challenges, as well as high levels of public debt.17 Such debt, which has been rising again since 2015, reflects the burden of general expenditure by the State18 and the fact that the country’s international partners have continued to suspend direct budget support and to reduce their donations significantly on account of repeated human rights violations in Burundi. 57. In response to this situation, the Government turned to domestic debt, which has “exploded”19 since 2015, further weakening the economy. It has also introduced new taxes and duties and has increased existing ones. For example, taxes on sugar and on fuel and lubricants were raised by 33 per cent and 95 per cent, respectively, between 2015 and 2018. Added to this was the contribution “for the 2020 elections”, which was established extralegally in December 201720 and duplicates a provision in the State’s 2017 budget. This contribution, which is payable by civil servants, households and students of voting age, has in a number of cases been collected forcibly, in particular by Imbonerakure. This has led to cases of ill-treatment, arbitrary arrest and detention, threats, intimidation and persecution in the event that a person is unwilling or unable to pay. 58. These levies, together with various ad hoc contributions imposed at the local level, are impoverishing a population whose real per capita gross domestic product has shown negative growth since 201521 and whose share of “non-poor” households was only 20.9 per cent prior to the crisis. 22 Poverty is especially prevalent among households headed by women who are single, widowed or divorced. 23 The population’s access to goods, especially essential items imported from abroad, has been hindered by the rise in exchange rates and inflation since 2015. In the space of two years, the number of people “in need”, 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 12 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, protocol III, art. 2. United Nations humanitarian country team. UNDP, Risques et vulnérabilités du développement humain de la République du Burundi, Bujumbura, December 2016. IMF, Regional Economic Outlook: Sub-Saharan Africa. Fiscal Adjustment and Economic Diversification, Washington, D.C., October 2017. UNDP, Risques et vulnérabilités (see note 16). Ibid. Ordinance No. 530/540/1772. IMF, Regional Economic Outlook (see note 17). Cadre stratégique de croissance et de lutte contre la pauvreté, CSLP II: 2012–2015, Bilan de mise en œuvre, UNDP, December 2016. World Bank, Burundi Poverty Assessment, November 2016. GE.18-13070