A/HRC/39/63 aimed at gaining and keeping control over these resources for the purpose of personal enrichment and to fund activities to counter all opposition. 75. It is disturbing to observe that the findings set out in 2000 in the Arusha Agreement still characterize the situation today. Article 4 of Protocol I to the Agreement describes the Burundi conflict as “fundamentally political” and as resulting from “a struggle by the political class to accede to and/or remain in power”. It also identifies impunity, the lack of a sound development policy, failure to respect the principles of good governance and human rights and the “non-acceptance of peaceful coexistence, diversity and pluralism” as causes of violence and insecurity in Burundi.34 76. In order to prevent the recurrence of conflict in Burundi, as analysed in the Arusha Agreement, the Commission wishes to highlight a number of measures that fall within its mandate. These measures, which are outlined in the recommendations below, concern steps to safeguard civil liberties; thoroughly reform the judicial system and, in the meantime, consider establishing an independent mechanism empowered to investigate human rights violations in Burundi and to try the alleged perpetrators; reform the security sector and establish credible civilian oversight mechanisms; give priority to maximizing the allocation of resources for improving the population’s enjoyment of economic and social rights; and carry out reforms, particularly in the area of landownership, to safeguard the right to development. V. Conclusions and recommendations 77. In the light of its investigations, the Commission of Inquiry on Burundi is in a position to conclude that the serious human rights violations documented in the first year of its mandate, including crimes against humanity, have persisted in 2017 and 2018. Such violations include cases of summary execution, disappearance (including enforced disappearance), arbitrary arrest and detention, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, sexual violence, and violations of civil liberties such as the freedoms of expression, association, assembly and movement (see A/HRC/36/54). 78. While the State entities that are most often implicated in these violations continue to be the National Intelligence Service and the police, the Commission is concerned about the growing role being played by the Imbonerakure in a situation in which recruitment drives among the general public are being used as a means of suppressing all opposition. The Burundian State is responsible for the violations committed by Imbonerakure in this context. 79. Perpetrators of violations are operating in an overall climate of impunity. The Commission has found that, as matters stand, the Burundian judicial system is both unwilling and unable to identify and prosecute those responsible for violations. 80. The political crisis in Burundi has had a very negative impact on the country’s economic and social situation and has fuelled an increase in poverty. The Government has nonetheless imposed additional taxes and contributions, in contravention of the right of all persons to an adequate standard of living, and has failed to devote the greatest possible share of its domestic resources to the realization of economic and social rights. 81. In this context, the Commission continues to believe that the Arusha Agreement must remain the basis for any settlement of the crisis in Burundi. The Commission is especially concerned to note that there are no independent international mechanisms in Burundi that are in a position to investigate human rights violations. 82. As the Government of Burundi has not yet implemented the recommendations put forward by the Commission in its previous report (A/HRC/36/54), the 34 16 Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi, protocol III, art. 2. GE.18-13070