A/HRC/36/50/Add.1 82. These differences call into question the appropriateness and relevance of transposing, without modification, measures that were initially developed as a response to authoritarianism and (overly) strong States into fragile, post-conflict contexts. These measures presupposed the feasibility of relatively easy attributions of responsibility, strong institutions, high degrees of capacity and a manageable set of potential beneficiaries of the different transitional justice measures (relative to institutional capacities and resources). In post-conflict or fragile contexts, however, none of those presuppositions prevail. In addition to deep resource scarcities and capacity deficits in general, institutions relating to criminal justice may be weak or non-existent. The capacity and resources needed to implement a country-wide, large-scale administrative reparations programme may be absent. And whereas truth-seeking (and the corresponding truth commission model) made sense in postauthoritarian contexts as a foil to violations under the mantle of silence or secrecy, in contexts in which open conflict occurred, truth-seeking may need further specification and perhaps call for a different model. 83. Far from this being an argument in favour of giving up on transitional justice, it is a call to ensure that the proper preconditions for the implementation of the measures chosen are established, to choose the best institutional models relative to the context in order to satisfy the relevant rights, and to devote the necessary time and resources to build the required capacities. 3. “Mimicry” 84. A related challenge facing the field can be captured in terms of what some economists and organizational sociologists call “isomorphic mimicry”, the tendency to replicate institutional forms regardless of context and even of the specificities of the ends sought. There has been much discussion in the field about the “templatization” of transitional justice, as if it were a model that could or should be adopted in the same way in every place. So rather than starting with the question, “What are the most effective ways of realizing under particular circumstances the rights to truth, justice, reparation, and nonrecurrence?”, this question is sidestepped and efforts to implement a familiar set of initiatives and institutions are undertaken as if there were no choices to be made. The Special Rapporteur takes this opportunity to call once again for putting front and centre of transitional justice work the ends sought, the realization of a specific set of rights, rather than the reproduction of particular institutional forms. 4. Overemphasis on technocratic responses, institutional measures at the expense of cultural and individual interventions 85. The tendency to concentrate on institutions overshadows other dimensions of transitional justice work on which the sustainability of the institutional responses will also depend. In previous reports, the Special Rapporteur has warned against reducing transitional justice to a technocratic exercise as if it were simply a matter of clever institutional design. The success of transitional justice ultimately is reflected in (and also rests upon) changes at the level of culture and of individual convictions and dispositions. Achieving a high degree of social integration in the wake of massive and systematic violations calls for many different types of contributions including those designed to explore the many-layered legacies of those violations in the lives of individuals and communities, those designed to awaken empathy and solidarity, to gain new levels of tolerance and respect, aside from those that give meaning to the legal notion of rights. Education, various forms of cultural products and interventions and an open and accessible public sphere, among others, are dimensions of transitional justice work that have not received as much attention as they deserve. 5. Coordination with development and security policies 86. In all transitional contexts, but particularly in the weakly institutionalized postconflict countries, it would be a mistake to think that the agenda of transitional justice exhausts the agenda of transformations that these countries call for. Truth, justice, reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence are important tools, but only one part of a broader justice, security and development agenda that most post-conflict countries certainly 17