A/HRC/33/29 degrading treatment or punishment, as well as ensuring the right to a fair trial, are of particular importance. The clarity of legal provisions and the principle of legality are also essential, in accordance with article 15 of the Covenant. In addition, prohibiting arbitrary deprivation of nationality, as well as ensuring the right to privacy, particularly online, are also relevant. 10. With regard to derogations, it may be instructive to recall article 4 of the Covenant, which provides for the possibility for States to temporarily adjust certain obligations under the Covenant in a time of “public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”, provided that a number of conditions are met, notably that measures are limited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. Any measures thus taken need to be in genuine response to the situation and be fully justified by the circumstances. Therefore, the mere fact that derogating from a specific provision may, of itself, be justified by the exigencies of the situation does not obviate the requirement to demonstrate the necessity of the concrete measures taken pursuant to the derogation. 8 States also have to ensure that adequate safeguards are set up to protect against arbitrary and disproportionate interference with human rights, given that the protection of the individual against arbitrariness is inherent in the principle of legality and the rule of law, which remain binding regardless of circumstances. Above all, certain rights cannot be derogated from under any circumstances, including those relating to the arbitrary deprivation of life, the prohibition of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and freedom of thought, conscience and religion.9 11. In any case, even when limitations on certain human rights are permissible, a number of conditions must be met. First, such restrictions must be prescribed by law and comply with the principle of legality, which continues to apply even during a state of emergency. In this respect, legislation and policies to prevent or counter violent extremism should clearly define the phenomenon they are targeting and the ambit of related programmes. Laws and policies must be formulated with sufficient clarity and precision to guide the actions of those implementing them and enable members of the public to regulate their conduct accordingly. A law conferring discretion upon State officials in applying its provisions should delineate clearly the scope of such discretion and describe in detail the circumstances in which interference with human rights is permitted. It should also foresee independent oversight mechanisms, to which a concerned individual can lodge complaints. 12. While the above provisions provide important guidance on assessing conduct, there are serious challenges in their application. To start with, terrorist and violent extremist groups10 tend to operate in a secretive and decentralized manner, which makes their detection difficult. States have therefore tried to capture very early manifestations of radicalization, with some of these measures seriously infringing on the enjoyment of human rights.11 Some researchers have been trying to establish some “indicators of 8 9 10 11 See Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 29 (2001), para. 4. See article 4 (2) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which provides that “no derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1 and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision”. Nicholas Pace, “Decentralization: the future of ISIS”, Small Wars Journal (November 2014); Thomas Mockaitis, The “New” Terrorism: Myths and Reality (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 2008), p. 120; Nathan Hamilton and David Gray, “Decentralized terrorism: ramifications for a centralized international system”, Global Security Studies, vol. 3, Issue 2 (spring 2012). Harriet Allan and others, “Drivers of violent extremism: hypotheses and literature review” (Royal United Services Institute, 16 October 2015). 5