A/HRC/39/52 offences. 35 The criminalization of victims of trafficking or servitude is exacerbated by among law enforcement personnel based on power, gender, race and social status. 36 35. Labour inspectors are not often allowed to inspect private homes without judicial authorization, which means that there is no oversight over the working and living conditions of domestic workers. That has serious consequences, for all domestic workers, but particularly for migrant domestic workers in an irregular situation, for example regarding their access to health care, social protection and labour rights, such as rest time, regulated working hours or maternity leave. 37 Furthermore, migrant workers in an irregular situation often lack knowledge about the applicable laws, their rights and their employer’s obligations, much less about support and protection services and even the risks they might face during the migration process and upon arrival in the country of destination. 38 Even if legislation is favourable, workers are often not informed about their rights, the duration of their contract, salary, weekly time off or daily hours in order to prevent abuse. 36. In some countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which host about 2 million migrant domestic workers, and in other Arab States, such as Lebanon, migrant workers are particularly vulnerable to exploitation due to the kafala system of labour sponsorship (A/HRC/36/43). Under this system, the immigration status of a migrant worker is legally bound to an individual employer or sponsor for the period of the contract. Control over the worker is often increased by their employer confiscating their passport and travel documents, despite legislation in some destination countries that declares this practice illegal. 39 Being required to live in the employer’s home increases the dependency on the employer, blurs work and rest time and raises privacy concerns. Owing to the live-in rule, enforcement of regulations and monitoring of the working conditions of migrant domestic workers are difficult and limited, as any abuse takes place behind closed doors. 37. Domestic workers in diplomatic households face similar practices, as their residence permits are commonly linked to their employers, leading to a major protection gap based on the dependency and vulnerability of the domestic worker. 40 Accessing justice is very difficult for domestic workers in diplomatic households owing to the immunity of the employer. 41 In recent years, however, efforts led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) to prevent domestic servitude in diplomatic households have resulted in normative changes in at least 16 OSCE States. In the United States of America, the federal authorities have prosecuted 11 criminal cases against diplomats and international officials for trafficking, abuse and exploitation of domestic workers since 2000.42 38. Migrant domestic workers in an irregular situation are “invisible” to national authorities and often face language barriers, a lack of knowledge about their rights and often lack a safety net or a social network in the host country. Owing to fear of deportation, domestic workers tend to live in anonymity, which can lead to isolation and hence to an enabling environment for forced labour and servitude. 43 39. Evidence gathered has shown that if migrant domestic workers have contracts that are not tied to their employers and if they are free to change jobs in cases of abuse, that provides them with a safe way out of situations of servitude and abuse. Such measures are only effective, however, if migrant domestic workers are not required to leave the country 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 Ibid. ILO, “Lessons learned by the work in freedom programme” (New Delhi, 2017). See Committee on Migrant Workers, general comment No. 1 (2011) on migrant domestic workers, para. 43. ILO Ethiopia, submission for the present report. Migrant Forum Asia, policy brief No. 2, “Reform of the kafala (sponsorship) system”, available at www.ilo.org/dyn/migpractice/docs/132/PB2.pdf. Ban Ying and LEFÖ-IBF. Ibid. Human Trafficking Legal Center, submission for the present report. Ibid. 9