A/HRC/4/71 page 7 12. Zbigniew Ziobro, Poland Minister of Justice, showed that corruption tends to create illegitimate interest groups with informal mafia-like structures of power that operate against the interest of the general public. To prevent or to counter corruption, legal mechanisms, transparency in the public arena and an efficient legal system are needed. Mr. Ziobro described how immediately following the end of communism, Poland pursued mistaken measures based on mistaken assumptions, namely the “naïve belief” that the free market would operate well without effective State structures and institutions, and that State intervention would be harmful. Polish citizens now recognize that the proper role of the State is to protect civil rights rather than the political order. In 2002, following a scandal involving public officials, a number of practices were reclassified as crimes. New measures that are proving effective in reducing corruption were introduced. For example, impunity is granted to the briber who notifies the Government ahead of the act; such a mechanism works by arousing fear in those who might consider accepting a bribe. Mr. Ziobro concluded by noting the need for international rules to allow for access to information about tax havens and the bribes being transferred there. 13. President Eduardo Rodriguez-Veltze, former President of Bolivia and former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, drew on his experience to elaborate on the impact of corruption on human rights. Invoking the parallel debate on the relationship between rule of law and development, he questioned whether ending corruption was a prerequisite for or a product of the realization of human rights. He attributed the difficulty in answering this question to the fact that they involve “human attitudes”. Mr. Rodriguez-Veltze maintained that good governance can help provide solutions for both sources of corruption - people’s “needs” (for resources) and people’s “greed” (for power) - and that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the original human rights agreements should be the foundations of good governance. Turning to Bolivia’s experience, he noted that, despite nearly two decades of democracy, the country still has problems in the areas of good governance, corruption and respect for human rights. Mr. Rodriguez-Veltze attributed this poor record to the difficulties of reconciling majoritarian democracy and universal values with the claims of interest groups. He expressed concern regarding the collision of “claims by groups” and the way they make those claims (e.g.: blockades, strikes) with the “rights of individuals” who must deal with the results. Mr. Rodriguez-Veltze concluded by expressing scepticism regarding the usefulness of indices that rank countries, like Transparency International’s index on perception of corruption, for challenging governments and suggested the need for indices that capture what countries have done well or best. 14. Fredrik Eriksson, Managing Director, Integrity Management and Programme for Accountability and Transparency, addressed the damage that clientelism in public administration does to human rights and how regulatory transparency can prevent it. He observed that the experience of Scandinavian countries demonstrates that access to information and transparency can prevent corruption. The centrality of access to information derives from the fact that it is a prerequisite for accountability. Mr. Eriksson explained how, by undermining competence and control over resources, clientelism weakens the capacity of the public administration to formulate and implement policies, thereby depriving the public, particularly the weakest and most vulnerable, of the fulfilment of their needs. Furthermore, when officials are promoted despite their lack of competence, they become beholden to their patrons whose interests they come to serve. Mr. Eriksson then turned to two examples of regulatory transparency that address the problem of clientelism. Following the end of communism, Poland had a weak and highly politicized public administration rife with clientelism. The situation changed with the adoption