A/HRC/17/44 al-Thawri) includes six brigades (the Special Forces Brigade, the Infantry Brigade, the Artillery Brigade and three tank brigades, all stationed on the outskirts of Tripoli). It is thought to be approximately 40,000 strong38 and “the real frontier protection force”.39 The force has access to battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, helicopters and possibly antiaircraft artillery and guided weapons. A unit from the Guards, composed solely of female soldiers and known as the “Green Nuns” or “Revolutionary Nuns” serves as the Colonel‟s bodyguards. Members of the Revolutionary Guard are uniformed. 2. An amorphous system 43. The structure, mandate and reporting lines of the country‟s various security agencies described above, including the Kata’eb and the Revolutionary Committees remain unclear to outside observers. Transparency and accountability mechanisms are limited to an extreme. This amorphous system, in the Commission‟s view, reflects a purposeful policy to obfuscate responsibility and minimize any threat to the central control of Colonel Qadhafi himself. The most important characteristic of these security organizations is that they are subject to neither institutional political control nor control by the public, but have been controlled exclusively by the Revolutionary Leadership led by Colonel Qadhafi. 44. All the information which the Commission received indicated that the agencies described above operate pursuant to direct orders of the Colonel. Lines of communication between the various security organizations are vertical and ultimately meet in the office of Colonel Qadhafi. Orders appear to be given by Colonel Qadhafi through satellite phone calls to commanders. It is also likely that some orders may have been issued by text message, but it is mostly personal communication based on voice recognition. This makes more difficult the task of tracing orders and commands. 45. Furthermore, according to information received by the Commission, some communications to security agencies may be given by code in public speeches. For example, before attacking Benghazi, Colonel Qadhafi said publicly: “I love you Benghazi”, which was interpreted by some who spoke to the Commission as meaning “I will come after you”. A former Libyan diplomat publicly stated on 23 February 2011, that Colonel Qadhafi‟s speech of the night before (22 February) was a code for his forces to attack certain locations, including Az-Zawiyah, Sorman and Sabratah, which were subsequently attacked on 23 February.40 It has been contended that Colonel Qadhafi established a “oneman rule” in which his officials “instantly promoted the Leader‟s pronouncements to dogma”.41 3. The opposition armed forces 46. The forces on the opposition side of the armed conflict have formed recently and – at least according to information available to the Commission – do not appear to have the same level of organization as regular armed forces. Groups of supporters of the opposition came together in various cities and merged with defecting individual army soldiers and 38 39 40 41 16 See Global Security, “Al Haras Assauri: Revolutionary Guard”. Available from www.globalsecurity.org/intell/world/libya/rg.htm. United States Government, Library of Congress, “Libya: Federal Research Study and Country Profile with Comprehensive Information, History, and Analysis - Politics, Economy, Military - Mu‟ammar al Qadhafi”, (2011, Progressive Management). The Telegraph, “Gaddafi‟s speech was „code to start genocide against Libyans‟”, 23 February 2011. Available from www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/libya/8342349/Gaddafispeech-was-code-to-begin-genocide-against-Libyans.html. Dirk Vandewalle, A History of Modern Libya (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 177.