A/HRC/27/32 targeted entity should be questioned and it could be argued that the Security Council should have exclusive competence in such a situation. She proposed that sanctions could remain symbolic, and stated that they should in all cases be equitable and not only effective, and should be accompanied by dialogue, mediation and negotiation. V. Session II. Mechanisms to assess and mitigate the adverse impact of unilateral coercive measures and ensure accountability 17. The panellists were Antonios Tzanakopoulos, Associate Professor of Public International Law at the University of Oxford, Susanne Kühn, Head of the Public Sector Integrity Programme at Transparency International, and Obiora Okafor, Professor at Osgoode Hall Law School and member of the Human Rights Council Advisory Committee. 18. Mr. Tzanakopoulos defined a unilateral coercive measure as a measure that was in the first instance unlawful under international law, but whose wrongfulness was precluded owing to the fact that it was taken by a State that had been injured by an internationally wrongful act against the State that bore responsibility for that act. All unilateral coercive measures must respect the principle of proportionality. In that connection, measures adversely affecting human rights would likely be disproportionate, as they would have effects that were not commensurate with the injury suffered by the reacting State. However, it would be difficult to establish a direct relation between the unilateral coercive measure and the adverse effect on the enjoyment of human rights. 19. Examining potential avenues for legal accountability for unilateral coercive measures, Mr. Tzanakopoulos considered both diplomatic and adjudicatory means of dispute resolution. He noted that any imbalance in the relative power of the States party to the dispute might hamper progress, so the best protection for a weak State targeted by unilateral coercive measures that it considered unlawful would be adjudication. However, judicial settlement was premised on the consent of all parties to the dispute, which might be difficult to obtain in practice if the State implementing the unilateral coercive measures had not previously indicated consent through unilateral declarations or compromissory clauses in bilateral or multilateral treaties. It was further premised on the willingness of the targeted State to challenge unilateral coercive measures; members of the population suffering the adverse impact had no direct say in the matter. A final possibility would be for third States to argue that disproportionate unilateral coercive measures affecting human rights constituted a breach of an obligation erga omnes, which would allow them in turn to impose coercive measures on the State imposing the disproportionate measures. That would assume solidarity rarely seen in the international community, and so he considered that the best mechanism to mitigate the adverse human rights impacts of unilateral coercive measures might be to mobilize public opinion against such measures. That had been done effectively in the case of United Nations sanctions imposed under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, and had resulted in the creation of a hard monitoring mechanism, at least with respect to one sanctions regime (the creation of the Office of the Ombudsperson in accordance with Security Council resolutions 1904 (2009) and 1989 (2011)). The creation of a similar, perhaps softer, monitoring mechanism might be an option in the case of unilateral coercive measures, but Mr. Tzanakopoulos noted that all attempts to subject such measures to hard monitoring had been abandoned by the International Law Commission during its work on the articles on responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts. 20. Ms. Kühn addressed the potential positive role that targeted unilateral coercive measures might play in the fight against corruption and impunity. She noted that corrupt 7