A/HRC/27/32 determination and the right to development, and some supported the call for the creation of a new special procedure on the human rights impact of unilateral coercive measures. 24. Responding to a question about the determination of responsibility for the human rights impacts of unilateral coercive measures, Mr. Tzanakopoulos explained that such a determination depended on showing causality, but that both the State imposing coercive measures and the State targeted could be legally responsible for violations where causality was established. Regarding the creation of an international mechanism to determine the legality of unilateral coercive measures, Mr. Tzanakopoulos reiterated that it was unrealistic due to differing views among Member States. He noted that a strategy of division might not have a useful outcome, and could lead to an unstable and politicized mechanism. Ms. Kühn highlighted the role of civil society and the media in holding international organizations to account and, in response to a point made by the Chair, noted that the legitimacy of the G-20 to impose targeted sanctions was questionable. Mr. Okafor agreed with one speaker that the dominant media had not fulfilled their role of informing the public about the action of Governments on sanctions. He noted that many mechanisms became “instruments of the powerful”, and that of the five permanent members of the Security Council, only the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland currently accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. VI. Session III. Contemporary unilateral coercive measures: learning lessons from the past to develop basic principles to redress adverse impacts 25. The panellists were Ingrid Macdonald, Geneva Director of the Norwegian Refugee Council, Denis Halliday, former United Nations Humanitarian Coordinator in Iraq, and Sarah Zaidi, consultant, former Executive Director of the International Treatment Preparedness Coalition and co-founder of the Center for Economic and Social Rights. 26. Ms. Macdonald discussed the impact of counter-terrorism policies, including sanction regimes, on the operation of humanitarian organizations, referring to the 2013 Study on the Impact of Donor Counter-Terrorism Measures on Principled Humanitarian Action commissioned by the Norwegian Refugee Council and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. She noted that Member States were the architects of international law, and that the Geneva Conventions and a number of Security Council and General Assembly resolutions acknowledged the primacy and principles of humanitarian action. However, there was often a contradiction between those principles and the application of counter-terrorism measures, including sanctions. Some States prohibited support to anyone associated with terrorists, but it was beyond the mandate of humanitarian organizations to determine whether individuals were, for example, family members or neighbours of terrorists. Such organizations might also need to engage with terrorist organizations to ensure their own security. Another contradiction was that, in accordance with Security Council resolution 1612 (2005), the protection of children should be enhanced, but organizations that provided training on the non-recruitment of child soldiers might be criminally liable under “zero tolerance” counter-terrorism policies. 27. Ms. Macdonald further noted that unilateral coercive measures might prevent humanitarian organizations from making financial transfers to States where they work, citing the examples of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Somalia and the Sudan. Exemptions often took too long to obtain in circumstances of urgent humanitarian need, and banks were increasingly unwilling to take the risk of allowing any transfer to States targeted by coercive measures. That also affected the ability of individuals to transfer remittances, which often provided a vital lifeline for vulnerable populations. 9