A/HRC/42/46 12. The situation in that regard has only worsened since 2017. On 2 May 2019, the United States re-activated the provisions of Title III of the Helms-Burton Act of 1996, thereby extending the reach of the embargo to foreign companies trading with Cuba. The move allows for civil suits to be brought before United States courts against European Union companies (and companies of other countries, including Canada) for “trafficking” in property expropriated by the Government of Cuba from United States owners after 1959.6 13. Reactivating Title III means unilaterally terminating the modus vivendi between the European Union and the United States that rests on a bilateral agreement reached in London in 1998 according to which the United States waived Titles III and IV of the Helms-Burton Act and committed to resist the extraterritorial application of legislation of that kind in the future,7 thereby ending the transatlantic dispute that the adoption of the Helms-Burton Act had prompted.8 This marks a significant shift in Euro-Atlantic relations. 14. Indeed, the European Union has already called on the United States to continue to fully respect and implement the London agreement of 1998. It has stressed repeatedly that it has “firmly and continuously opposed any such measures, due to their extraterritorial impact on the European Union, in violation of commonly accepted rules of international trade”, 9 adding that “we cannot accept that unilaterally imposed measures impede our economic and commercial relations with Cuba”.10 15. Meanwhile, the embargo imposed on Cuba has continued to exert a massive toll on the Cuban economy, as reported by the Government of Cuba 11 and by international organizations.12 The impacts on human rights of this policy of comprehensive economic coercion continues to be documented.13 The repeated condemnations by the international community of the unilateral sanctions on Cuba have gained new momentum and nearly universal consensus since the latest General Assembly resolution on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba was adopted on 1 November 2018, with 192 States voting in favour and 2 States (Israel and the United States) voting against.14 C. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 16. In recent months the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela has witnessed an escalation in the political standoff between the Government and the opposition, which has turned into a legitimacy struggle. An intense international media campaign has taken place, most of it hostile to the government of President Nicolás Maduro. The decision taken by the United States and by a number of Western States to stop recognizing the Maduro government in favour of the self-proclaimed interim “president” Juan Guaidó has been met with threats, both veiled and open, of military intervention in the name of humanitarian intervention. All this has added to an already unstable political situation and a disastrous economic situation 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Stephen Wicary, “Trump nears key Cuba sanctions decision over support for Maduro”, 27 February 2019. Stefaan Smis and Kim van der Borght, “The EU-US compromise on the Helms-Burton and D’Amato acts”, American Journal of International Law, vol. 93, No. 1 (January 1999), pp. 227–236. Brigitte Stern, “Vers la mondialisation juridique?: les lois Helms-Burton et D’Amato-Kennedy”, Revue générale de droit international public, vol. 100, No. 4 (1996), pp. 979–1,003. See https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/un-new-york/53167/eu-explanation-vote-united-nationsgeneral-assembly-ending-economic-commercial-and-financial_en. Ibid. In a submission to the General Assembly dated 9 July 2018, the Government of Cuba reported accumulated losses caused by the embargo amounting to $933,678,000,000 (A/73/85, p. 27). See, e.g., the submission of the United Nations Development Programme dated 11 June 2018 (A/73/85, pp. 137–142). See, e.g., the submission of the World Health Organization/Pan American Health Organization dated 4 June 2018 (A/73/85, pp. 151–155). See also A/72/370, para. 8. General Assembly resolution 73/8 is the latest in a long series of Assembly resolutions, adopted annually since 1992, on the necessity of ending the economic, commercial and financial embargo imposed by the United States against Cuba. 5