A/HRC/42/46 States economic interests. For example, transactions with CITGO Holding, Inc., which is owned by Petróleos de Venezuela, are allowed, as are certain transactions by United States owners of certain Venezuelan/Petróleos de Venezuela bonds on secondary markets, financing for agricultural and medical exports, and short-term financing to facilitate trade.28 26. In March 2018, President Trump issued executive order 13827, which prohibits transactions involving the issuance and use by the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela of any digital currency, digital coin or digital token (the Maduro government had launched a cryptocurrency known as “the petro” in February 2018, in an effort to circumvent sanctions). 29 In May 2018, President Trump issued executive order 13835, which prohibits transactions related to the purchase of Venezuelan debt, including accounts receivable, and to any debt owed to the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela pledged as collateral. United States officials assert the action was intended to deny corrupt Venezuelan officials the ability to improperly value and sell off public assets in return for kickbacks.30 27. Then, on 1 November 2018, President Trump issued executive order 13850, setting forth a framework to block the assets of and prohibit certain transactions with persons operating in the gold sector (or any other sector of the economy as determined in the future by the Secretary of the Treasury) or to be responsible or complicit in transactions involving deceptive practices or corruption and the Government of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. In January 2019, pursuant to executive order 13850, the United States Administration sanctioned 7 individuals and 23 companies for involvement in a corruption scheme involving currency exchange practices that generated more than $2.4 billion. 28. Finally, on 28 January 2019, pursuant to executive order 13850, the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury designated Petróleos de Venezuela, which is the lifeline of the Venezuelan economy. As a result, all property and interests in property of Petróleos de Venezuela subject to United States jurisdiction have been blocked, and United States citizens and companies generally are prohibited from engaging in transactions with the company. European sanctions 29. By contrast, the sanctions imposed by the European Union, in force since November 2017, have remained limited to an embargo on the export of weapons and equipment for internal repression and to a travel ban and an asset freeze targeting 18 Venezuelans “holding official positions and responsible for human rights violations as well as for undermining democracy and the rule of law in Venezuela”.31 However, it was reported in February 2019 that the European Union was considering imposing more sanctions on the Maduro government, although the option of an oil embargo is excluded at this stage. The Foreign Minister of Malta, Carmelo Abela, said, following a meeting of European Union ministers of foreign affairs in Brussels, that “the intention ... is that sanctions can be possible on certain individuals rather than on issues that might have an effect on an already weakened economy” and that “having further (sectoral) sanctions is not excluded but primarily we are focused on certain individuals”.32 Economic warfare 30. “For some time now, the United States had been using Venezuela’s vulnerabilities to engage in a low-grade economic war. Instead of military action, the US has imposed selected economic sanctions against certain Venezuelans, … with threats of worse to come. But, as of January 28, 2019, the US has declared a full-scale economic assault. Indeed, it declared an embargo against Petróleos de Venezuela … that controls the world’s largest oil 28 29 30 31 32 8 Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Council of the European Union, “Venezuela: EU renews sanctions for one year”, press release, 6 November 2018. Reuters, “EU studying more sanctions on Venezuela, no oil embargo: Malta”, 4 February 2019.