A/HRC/42/46 Representative of the Secretary-General on unilateral coercive measures 60. The Special Rapporteur has suggested, in his previous reports to the Human Rights Council and the General Assembly (A/HRC/39/54, para. 52, and A/73/175, para. 54), that the Secretary-General appoint a special representative on unilateral coercive measures with a remit that would be broader than that of the Special Rapporteur and that would include facilitating a dialogue to solve the underlying causes of such measures (or, alternatively, several special representatives, each in charge of a country-specific sanctions regime, as appropriate). The Special Rapporteur believes that this would be a welcome step by the United Nations, especially in light of recent worrying developments related to the increased use of comprehensive sanctions and embargoes. It is a step that would permit the United Nations to be involved in mitigating initiatives and to provide support to affected people and communities. The Special Rapporteur also expresses hope that the vast majority of countries, as part of their commitment to protecting innocent segments of the population, in particular the most vulnerable, would support the idea of appointing such a special representative of the Secretary-General. VI. Conclusions 61. As evidenced by the cases mentioned in section III of the present report (which is of course by no means exhaustive), the recent application of ever more stringent economic sanctions worldwide is a salient feature of international relations, one that is creating an increasing level of tension of which millions of innocent people are the daily victims. It is no exaggeration to assert that economic sanctions and blockades are increasingly becoming a threat to international peace and security, to the extent that their unwarranted and systematic use exacerbates inter-State tensions and leads to more violations of human rights, while distorting the architecture of the collective security system embodied by the Charter of the United Nations. 62. It used to be claimed that resort to unilateral sanctions was a means of exerting pressure on targeted States that avoided military confrontation.79 The increased use of blockades and of sanctions regimes of such a scale and magnitude that they practically amount to full-scale embargoes, with no alternative to the targeted Government other than unconditional surrender, unilateral sanctions have lost the alleged quality of a diplomatic tool and appear more and more as a preamble for violent confrontation.80 It is worth recalling that Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations sets out an obligation on States to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. Moreover, while scholars continue to argue about whether “force” in the meaning of article 2 (4) of the Charter should be interpreted as extending also to “economic coercion”, it has been persuasively advocated that such a view constitutes the correct interpretation of that Charter provision.81 79 80 81 18 For a criticism of that view, see A/70/345, para. 7. A typical case is that of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, where crippling economic sanctions are used in conjunction with repeated, almost unveiled, threats of military intervention. See, e.g., “Trump says all options are on the table for Venezuela”, Reuters, 23 January 2019. See, e.g., “The use of nonviolent coercion: a study in legality under Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations”, University of Pennsylvania Law Review, vol. 122, pp. 983–1011.