A/HRC/40/CRP.1 with a Chinese company in early 2014, using oil to pay for military equipment. 1048 On the National Petroleum and Gas Commission, the Commission received information that this body is currently not functioning, since the resignation of its chairman. 1049 The implementation of key provisions on the protection of the environment, through the conduct of assessments on the impact of oil production for the local community, has reportedly also been inadequate.1050 Only one such assessment was apparently done in 2013, prior to the outbreak of conflict. 1051 The Commission is aware of recent reports of serious health risks in Ruweng and Northern Upper Nile States, caused by the exposure of local inhabitants to oil-related pollution.1052 A specific and highly symbolic issue has been the failure of the state to ensure the allocation of the two and three percent of oil revenues to oil-producing states and communities. It has been established that the three percent revenue share had not been transferred to oil-producing communities since 2011, and as a result these communities are now owed an estimated USD $305 million.1053 Furthermore the bodies that by law need to be created to carry out this process – such as the Community Development Council have reportedly not been set up.1054 While some of the two percent of revenue to the oil producing states was reportedly allocated and transferred, this was either done improperly (in some years exceeding the two percent, and in others falling short of it), and/or the money sometimes never reached the intended recipients in the states.1055 It is also of concern that the process of allocation and transfer, as well the expenditure of these shares appears to have been completely un-transparent,1056 and, for example, information on the disbursement of the entire amount of the two percent is not available.1057 .1058 As it is, paradoxically, inhabitants of oil-rich areas have been described as “among some of the worst off people in the country”.1059 The Commission believes that the continued withholding of the lawful share of oil revenue due to affected populations is likely to be viewed as a sign of corruption. Hence it may lead to long-term mistrust of the state and foster resentment within communities, carrying a risk of violence. Therefore, the implementation of these particular provisions is of key importance in preventing instability and a return to violent conflict and further human rights violations, Another fundamental and long-standing grievance of (former) inhabitants of oil-rich areas that has largely been left unaddressed by the South Sudanese Government is the issue of outstanding compensation for land and property of people who were forcefully displaced for the oil exploration.1060 While the issue of compensation, was incorporated into the 2005 1048 This reportedly involved a USD $20 million contract with the Chinese company Norinco to buy communications and military equipment in exchange for oil; the contract had reportedly been negotiated by the South Sudanese President, the Chief of Staff and the Minister of Petroleum directly with their Chinese counterparts and was not signed in the end, although two oil shipments had arrived already in China. Confidential Meeting, Addis Ababa, 4 December 2017. 1049 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 18 December 2018. 1050 European Coalition on Oil in South Sudan/PAX, “Scrutiny of South Sudan’s Oil Industry: Community Relations, Labour Practices and Impact on Land Use Patterns”, 2014, pp. 10-12. 1051 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 18 December 2018. 1052 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 18 December 2018; Confidential Meeting, Juba, 14 October 2018; Al Jazeera, “Restarting oil wells in South Sudan has uncertain health effects”, 23 November 2018. 1053 Ariic David Reng, Nhial Tiitmamer, “The Petroleum Revenue Sharing Arrangement in South Sudan”, The Sudd Institute, Special Report, May 22, 2018, p. 12; Confidential Meeting, Juba, 18 December 2018. 1054 Ariic David Reng, Nhial Tiitmamer, “The Petroleum Revenue Sharing Arrangement in South Sudan”, The Sudd Institute, Special Report, May 22, 2018, p. 13. 1055 Ariic David Reng, Nhial Tiitmamer, “The Petroleum Revenue Sharing Arrangement in South Sudan”, The Sudd Institute, Special Report, May 22, 2018, pp. 12-13. 1056 Ariic David Reng, Nhial Tiitmamer, “The Petroleum Revenue Sharing Arrangement in South Sudan”, The Sudd Institute, Special Report, May 22, 2018, pp. 13-14; Emmanuel Akile, “Government “owes public” explanations for oil revenues – Researcher”, Eye Radio, 13 December 2018. 1057 Parliamentarians are reportedly only informed about the total amount of the budget after deduction of the 2 percent/ 3 percent, not about the monetary amount of these percentages (Confidential Meeting, Juba, 18 December 2018). 1058 Ariic David Reng, Nhial Tiitmamer, “The Petroleum Revenue Sharing Arrangement in South Sudan”, The Sudd Institute, Special Report, May 22, 2018, p. 2, citing Frankel (2011) and Lewin (2011). 1059 European Coalition on Oil in South Sudan/PAX, “Scrutiny of South Sudan’s Oil Industry: Community Relations, Labour Practices and Impact on Land Use Patterns”, 2014, p. 19. 1060 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 18 December 2018; European Coalition on Oil in Sudan , Unpaid Debt, The Legacy of Lundin, Petronas and OMV in Block 5A, Sudan, 1997-2003, 2010, pp. 22, 50, 66-70. 135