A/HRC/40/CRP.1 formations and used strategically in the ongoing armed conflict.1099 This indicates that agriculture and farming, which constitutes another key part of South Sudanese economy, has also become increasingly militarized, and as a result has become an additional catalyst of armed conflict. For example, as discussed below in the section on Western Bahr el Ghazal State (section VII(C)), the Commission was informed that cattle-keepers bringing their herds prematurely into the Wadhalelo area have, for some years, created tensions with the local population, sparking conflict there in June 2018. 1100 The traditional pastoralist practice of seasonally migrating cattle across grazing lands, which for many years occurred in a relatively peaceful manner, regulated and facilitated through local and semi-informal and tribal agreements and with assistance from UNMISS, 1101 has therefore increasingly become a factor in the outbreak of armed conflict, including in other parts of the country. 1102 In the case of Wadhalelo, as a result of conflicts between the Luo farmers and the Dinka pastoralists, the Luo inhabitants of Wadhalelo asked for support from the SPLA-IO which then drew in a response from the SPLA, drawing in the major military groups into what had been a local dispute. In this context, and given the key role of pastoralism for the livelihood of many South Sudanese, the Commission notes that, in building on existing local and inter-state initiatives, lessons may be learnt also from previous agreements between Sudan and South Sudan on the peaceful and inclusive management of transhumance in the dry season. For example, the Agreement on Border Issues between Sudan and South Sudan of 2012 underlines that, to facilitate the peaceful cross-border movement of cattle, the affected parties should consider “the primary interest of the host communities and the security implications of such movements”.1103 Agreements, which were reached subsequently resulted from extensive consultations and negotiations between local governments, tribal chiefs, community and civil society representatives and official and de facto security officials, facilitated by the UN and international NGOs.1104 In particular, the long-standing practice of holding annual pre- and post-migration conferences between local communities on both sides of the border was apparently a big contributing factor to improved communal relationships, preventing violent cattle rustling incidents.1105 b) Illegal timber harvesting and trading There has been a long-standing practice of exploiting the resource of timber, specifically teak, which is an increasingly rare commodity world-wide (with South Sudan reportedly holding the world’s largest, and Africa’s oldest, teak plantations) 1106 to fund, among other purposes, military operations and conflict in South Sudan, notably in Central and Western Equatoria States.1107 Both the Government and opposition forces have engaged in this illegal trade, including by exploiting local companies and harvesters, and inhibiting the formal teak industry.1108 Reports have indicated that the illegal timber trade in Yei River State in former Central Equatoria involved plunder by high-ranking members of the SPLA- Hannah Wild, Jok Madut Jok, Ronak Patel, “The militarization of cattle raiding in South Sudan, how a traditional practice became a tool for political violence”, Journal of International Humanitarian Action, 2018, 3:2. 1100 Witness 882, ERN 101577-101581, para. 6; Confidential Document, ERN D113892-D113900. 1101 Confidential Meeting, Wau, 4 December 2018; UNMISS, Zenebe Teklewold, Agreement on cattle migration has reduced conflict between farmers and herders in Western Bahr El Ghazal Region. 1102 REACH, “Kit – Nesitu Corridor Cattle Migration Brief, Juba County, Central Equatoria State, South Sudan”, April 2018; AfricaNews, “South Sudan herders, farmers discuss conflict over land, water”, 3 July 2018. 1103 Agreement Between The Republic of The Sudan and The Republic of South Sudan on Border Issues, Addis Ababa, 27 September 2012, Article 14 (2). 1104 Concordis, Crossing the Line: Transhumance in Transition Along the Sudan-South Sudan Border, October 2012, pp. 5-10. 1105 Steven Spittaels & Yannick Weyns, Mapping Conflict Motives: the Sudan-South Sudan Border, International Peace Information Service, January 2014. pp. 74-75. 1106 Cristian Nasulea, Beatrice Nicole Cretu, Ramona Madaline Moroianu, All Roads Lead to Juba: An Inquiry Into the Economic Viability of South Sudan, Revista Economica 68:6, p. 110. 1107 UN Security Council, Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Doc No: S/2017/979, 20 November 2017, para. 48. 1108 UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Doc No: S/2018/292, 12 April 2018, paras. 6466 and Annex VI; UN Security Council, Interim Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Doc No: S/2018/, 26 November 2018, paras. 77-83. 1099 140