A/HRC/40/CRP.1 human rights and international humanitarian law, as well as the criminal acts committed in Leer and Mayendit Counties between April and June 2018. The Commission requested information from the Government about any investigations, punitive action or prosecutions it has undertaken in relation to the violations and crimes committed in southern Unity between April and June 2018.1185 However, the Commission has received no information regarding steps taken by the Government to criminally investigate and prosecute those responsible for these events. As noted above, to the contrary, it appears that some of those involved were promoted rather than punished. B. Central Equatoria State, 2018 1. Background and Current Situation Central Equatoria State has historically been populated predominantly by Barispeaking communities, including the Kakwa, Bari, and Pojulu. However, other ethnic groups, including Dinka and Nuer, have also historically been present, particularly in Yei town. 1186 The southern part of Central Equatoria State (the new Yei River State), including Yei, Lainya, Morobo, and Kajo Keji Counties, remained relatively peaceful when the civil war broke out in South Sudan in December 2013. Yei, the main town in the area, is of strategic importance as it is a key junction for road traffic in the area and down to the border with the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Yei is a focal point for cross-border trade, and for the movement of people and goods in the local area, which is fertile and rich in natural resources, including in particular teak. Whilst Juba normally relies on the route through Nimule, in Eastern Equatoria, as its main supply route for the importation of goods from Uganda, any damage or threat to that route increases the strategic value of Yei as an alternative route. 1187 Reflecting the strategic importance of Yei and the southern part of Central Equatoria State (new Yei River State), from early 2016, the Government gradually militarized the area in an attempt to gain and maintain control of the area.1188 This involved the deployment of SPLA soldiers and the Mathiang Anyoor, a Dinka youth militia raised in Aweil by former SPLA Chief of Staff Paul Malong. 1189 Insufficiently trained and ill-disciplined, the Mathiang Anyoor contributed enormously to the subsequent alienation of the local Equatorian population.1190 The Mathiang Anyoor were deployed along the roads leading south to the borders to control access to and prevent civilians escaping from the area.1191 Government forces have continuously controlled the main towns, however, there are large gaps between SPLA held areas and this allows the opposition forces to communicate and move around relatively freely.1192 Following the crisis in July 2016, then First Vice President Riek Machar fled Juba, heading south through the Equatorias towards safety in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Initially, he was accompanied by between 2,000 and 4,000 supporters, including members of his armed security detail who had accompanied his return to Juba in April 2016.1193 As the targeting of Nuers in Juba continued, more and more Nuer joined the exodus southward, such that the SLPA-IO (RM) presence in Yei and Morobo counties eventually 1185 Note Verbale to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Government of South Sudan, Requesting Documentation from Different Ministries, CHRSS/COR/2018/32, 21 November 2018. 1186 REACH, “Situation Overview: Central and Eastern Equatoria, South Sudan”, April - June 2018. 1187 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 27 November 2018. 1188 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 27 November 2018. 1189 Human Security Baseline Assessment for South Sudan and Sudan, “Spreading Fallout: The Collapse of ARCSS and the new conflict along the Equatorias-DRC border”, Small Arms Survey, Number 28, May 2017, p. 13. For justification of EU sanctions against General Paul Malong, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32018R1115&from=EN. 1190 Witness 1055, ERN 102254-102260, paras. 15-19; Witness 1074, ERN 102296-102299, para. 5. 1191 Witness 1055, ERN 102254-102260, para. 17. See also Confidential Document, ERN D116653-D116702. 1192 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 19 November 2018. 1193 Human Security Baseline Assessment for South Sudan and Sudan, “Spreading Fallout: The Collapse of ARCSS and the new conflict along the Equatorias-DRC border”, Small Arms Survey, Number 28, May 2017, p. 3. 152