A/HRC/40/CRP.1 field commander when Wadhalelo was attacked in June 2018.1417 The Commission also considers there are reasonable grounds to believe that another identified Major was the SPLA commander based in Wadhalelo from at least July 2018 and knew of some of the crimes committed there but failed to take punitive action.1418 The Commission found no evidence that the regular military command and control structures had broken down such that the 5 Division Commander or his subordinate commanders would not have been exercising effective control over their forces. In interacting with the SPLA forces in the area, at no point did they indicate to the Commission and other international organisations that they were not in control of their forces. To the contrary, in certain instances they confirmed that they were in control of an area and required clearance from the 5 Division Commander to pass checkpoints showing they were respecting regular military lines authority.1419 Furthermore, there are reasonable grounds to believe that SPLA commanders in the area knew or had reason to know of the actions of their subordinates toward civilians. In this regard, the Commission notes that the attacks lasted five months and there were significant numbers of displaced people arriving into Wau so information about attacks on civilians would almost certainly have reached the Commanders, even if they did not order them. Additionally, the 5 Division Commander acknowledged in mid-July 2018 that the security situation in the Wau Triangle was “not good”, yet the security situation remained largely unchanged for months afterwards.1420 The Commission has received no information about steps taken by the SPLA commanders to prevent or put a stop to the attacks on civilians or to punish those who perpetrated the crimes in the Wau Triangle or Wadhalelo. In this regard, the Commission was told the 5 Division Commander is an experienced, effective and “no-nonsense” commander who would have taken immediate action against his subordinates had he not agreed with their actions. It can therefore be inferred from the continuation of these offences over many months that the Commander supported them.1421 Furthermore, the SPLA 15 Infantry Brigade Commander in Mboro between July and October 2018, effectively stated that to his knowledge, no SPLA members in Mboro had been investigated or detained in relation to violations in the area.1422 Information received by the Commission indicates that at least two of the SPLA commanders in Wadhalelo, both Majors, had violations directly reported to them but did not take steps to investigate or punish those involved. One of these commanders directly interacted with a rape victim, who identified her attacker; however, while the Major reportedly beat the soldier responsible during this interaction, no further steps were apparently taken to investigate the incident. 1423 Similarly, when a victim in Wadhalelo reported being beaten by SPLA soldiers to the second Major, his response was reportedly: “I was not there, it was my soldiers.”1424 This lends additional credence to the conclusion that he took no responsibility for criminal acts of his subordinates despite his knowledge of them and his responsibility to do so. The Commission therefore finds reasonable grounds to believe that at least these three SPLA Commanders knew or had reason to know that subordinates under their effective control were committing or had committed human rights violations and crimes against civilians, including war crimes, and they failed to take reasonable and necessary measures to prevent or punish them. Furthermore, in respect of the crimes committed in Wadhalelo during the first half of 2017, the SPLA 5 Division in Western Bahr el Ghazal was at the time under the command 1417 Confidential Document, ERN D113942-D113947; Witness 881, ERN 101582-101586, paras. 10-11. Witness 925, ERN 101886-101890, para. 13; Witness 915, ERN 101828-101835, para. 22; Confidential Document, ERN D113966-D113974. 1419 Confidential Meeting, Wau, 2 December 2018; Confidential Document, ERN D116253-D116260; Confidential Document, ERN D116119-D116154; Confidential Document, ERN D113948-D113957; Confidential Document, ERN D113958-D113965; Confidential Document, ERN D114804-D114809; Confidential Document, ERN D113966-D113974; Confidential Document, ERN D113987-D113992; Confidential Document, ERN D113982-D113986; Confidential Document, ERN D113942-D113947. 1420 Confidential Document, ERN D116155-D116252. 1421 Confidential Meeting, 3 December 2018. 1422 Confidential Meeting, Wau, 2 December 2018. 1423 Witness 881, ERN 101582-101586, paras. 10-11. 1424 Witness 925, ERN 101886-101890, para. 12. 1418 175