A/HRC/40/CRP.1 overstepped its mandate in its encroachment upon the oil sector in South Sudan, particularly through expanding its influence and control over the Nilepet state-owned oil company. Notably, the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau of the NSS, has reportedly been a member of the board of Nilepet since 2014, and the Commission has received information that other NSS officials similarly have transferred to or held positions in the company. Both the Director General of the Internal Security Bureau of the NSS and the then Minister of Petroleum and Mining and current Minister of Finance and Planning instructed Nilepet to settle security-related bills in January 2016. These payments included fees incurred for transporting troops and equipment, including to Wau, Malakal and Paloch, thus using oil revenues to pay for the Government’s military operations in these areas. 374 As part of the NSS’ general efforts in scrutinizing media activities, it has also obstructed and intimidated journalists criticizing aspects of the oil production in South Sudan.375 In addition, in March 2018, the NSS reportedly arrested the Nilepet Deputy Head of the Accounts, for “leaking documents exposing corrupt dealings in the government-own [sic] corporate”.376 To achieve its wide ranging tasks, the NSS has been granted extremely broad powers including the powers to:  monitor frequencies, wireless systems, publications, broadcasting stations and postal services with respect to security interests so as to prevent misuse by users;  request any information, statement, document, or any relevant material from any suspect and potential witness for perusal or examination, keep or take necessary or appropriate measures in respect of such information, statement, document or relevant material;  summon, investigate and take particulars and depositions from any suspect and potential witness;  seize any weapon, machine, tool, automobile or gadget suspected to be connected with an offence or crime against the state;  arrest and detain suspects for crimes related to National Security (set out in section 7 of the National Security Service Act);  carry out any other function assigned to it by the President or the Council in accordance with the Constitution; 377 and  gather and retain any information related to any person, persons or institutions as necessary for carrying out its duties and functions. 378 The National Security Service Act provides almost no safeguards against abuse of these very broad powers. Despite the fact that one of the stated purposes of the NSS is to protect the Constitution,379 and the NSS is subject to the authority of the Constitution,380 in a number of respects the National Security Service Act appears to contradict the provisions of the Constitution.381 For example, the National Security Service Act provides essentially no safeguards against prolonged and arbitrary detention. It stipulates that a person who is found committing, or reasonably suspected of having committed, or attempted to commit, or being about to commit an offence against the state, may be arrested without warrant. In the case of an arrest without warrant, the person must be brought before a magistrate, as soon as reasonably 374 Confidential document, ERN D113807-D113808. UN Security Council, Final Report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan, UN Doc No: S/2016/70, 22 January 2016, paras. 1923. 376 Radio Tamazuj, “National Security arrest senior Nilepet official over leaks”, 22 March 2018; Sudan Tribune, “S Sudan security arrest state-owned oil entity official”, 23 March 2018; Radio Tamazuj, “National Security still holding Nilepet official”, 27 March 2018. 377 National Security Service Act (2014), section 13(11) to (16). 378 National Security Service Act (2014), section 32. 379 National Security Service Act (2014), section 13(3). 380 National Security Service Act (2014), section 6(a). 381 Transitional Constitution (2011) as amended, Articles 12, 19, 22. 375 53