A/HRC/40/CRP.1 a 30-month Transition Period, and implementing the commitments contained in the ARCSS.6 The Peace Agreement declared a permanent ceasefire applicable to all forces of the warring parties, armed groups, and all other forces or militias allied to either party. 7 As part of the security arrangements, the parties agreed to continue to refrain from prohibited actions outlined in the 2014 Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, including actions that may impede or delay the provision of humanitarian assistance or protection to civilians; sexual and gender-based violence; recruitment and/or use of child soldiers by armed forces or militias; hostile propaganda, unauthorized recruitment, mobilization, redeployment and movement of forces; and acts of hostility, intimidation, violence or attacks against the civilian population including IDPs and returnees, UNMISS personnel, installations or equipment, international humanitarian agencies and organization and their personnel. 8 The Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission (JMEC) was established under the ARCSS as the main oversight mechanism to ensure its implementation. It was: “responsible for monitoring and overseeing the implementation of the Peace Agreement… In case of nonimplementation of the mandate and tasks of the TGoNU, or other serious deficiencies, the JMEC shall recommend appropriate corrective action…”9 The Ceasefire and Transitional Security Arrangements Monitoring Mechanism (CTSAMM) was established to monitor and verify alleged ceasefire violations.10 B. Breakdown of the ARCSS In October 2015, not long after the signing of the ARCSS in August with extensive reservations, particularly from the Government, President Salva Kiir unilaterally declared a new “decentralised” system of 28 states, to replace the original 10.11 In January 2017, President Kiir announced the creation of additional states, bringing the total to 32.12 As discussed below, the creation of new states exacerbated tensions over boundaries and access to natural resources and continued to fuel conflict across the country. Following international pressure, Riek Machar took up the position of First Vice President in the TGoNU serving under President Kiir. This uneasy truce did not last long. Following skirmishes in Juba between the SPLA and SPLA-IO in early July 2016, significant fighting broke out at the official residence of the President in the city on 8 July 2016. The fighting spread and resulted in widespread killings and rape of civilians, and extensive property damage and looting. At least 36,000 people were displaced, and 300 killed in fighting between the SPLA and the SPLA-IO, that involved the use of combat helicopters, tanks and other heavy weapons.13 The violence in Juba triggered further violence across the country. First Vice President Riek Machar and his SPLA-IO forces were forced out of Juba, and pursued across Central and Western Equatoria to the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Following a ceasefire, declared on 11 July 2016, the SPLA-IO member Taban Deng Gai was appointed First Vice President to replace Riek Machar, and allowed to fill executive positions previously nominated by First Vice President Riek Machar. Thereafter, Taban Deng Gai’s forces, referred to as SPLA-IO (TD) fought forces loyal to Riek Machar, referred to as SPLM/A-IO (RM) and carried out operations in Upper Nile, Unity, Western Bahr el Ghazal, and Jonglei States. The conflict metastasized from a conflict primarily between the SPLA and the SPLAIO to one that spread into new areas, particularly the Equatorias and reflected multiple defections and splinter groups. 6 The Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan, (2015) (ARCSS) was signed on 17 August 2015. ARCSS (2015), Chapter II, Article 1.3. 8 ARCSS (2015), Chapter II, Article 1.7. 9 JMEC, see http://jmecsouthsudan.org/. 10 CTSAMM reports are publicly available (http://ctsamm.org/reports-documents/ctsamm-violation-reports/). 11 Establishment Order, No. 36/2015, 2 October 2015 (28 States Decree). 12 Establishment Order No. 36/2015, 2 October 2015; Republican Order, No. 02/2017, 14 January 2017. 13 Øystein H. Rolandsen & Nicki Kindersley, “South Sudan: A Political Economy Analysis”, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 16 October 2017, p. 7. 7 11