A/HRC/40/CRP.1 4. Impact of the creation of the Twenty-eight and Thirty-two States The creation of the new states received mixed reactions in different areas of the country and in different groups. Some, welcomed the move which created more ethnically homogenous states as being likely to decrease ethnic tensions by giving each group their own areas.890 For example, in Lakes State, although a relatively homogenous Dinka state, it experienced significant inter-communal violence between Dinka clans, which decreased notably after the 28 States Decree divided the state in three.891 Meanwhile, in Unity State, reactions varied widely. The Padang Dinka of Pariang and Abiemon Counties in the north of Unity State were delighted, having long felt marginalised in a Nuer majority state.892 Further, their new Ruweng State contains most of Unity State’s oil fields. However, to join Pariang and Abeimon Counties into a contiguous state, a triangle of land from Rubkona County, now part of Northern Liech State, was annexed onto Ruweng State. Not only did this deprive Rubkona of its valuable land bridge for trade links with Sudan, it also placed approximately 10 Nuer villages from Rubkona County in Dinka dominated Ruweng State. Furthermore, the Bul Nuer community from Mayom County were ambivalent about the new arrangement as they had fought with the Government, creating significant tensions with other Nuer communities with whom they now shared the new Northern Liech State. Meanwhile, the Nuer of southern Unity State, which became the homogenous Nuer Southern Liech State disliked the division as it cut them off from Unity’s oil revenues.893 In a number of areas, the creation of new states had the effect of exacerbating or triggering conflict. Two such examples are set out below to illustrate the challenges of redrawing borders. In the former Upper Nile State, ethnic groups were separated and given their own states, which might have been expected to decrease conflict but actually sparked conflict over areas claimed by multiple groups but effectively allocated to one group. On the other hand, the new Lol State joined two different ethnic groups together which also sparked conflict as neither group wanted to share a state, and resulted in a largely non-functioning government. In both cases, people found themselves pushed out of their jobs on the basis of their place of origin. a) Upper Nile Under the 28 States Decree, Upper Nile State was divided largely along ethnic lines into three states: Shilluk dominated Western Nile, Dinka dominated Eastern Nile, and Nuer dominated Latjoor States. While the west bank of the upper Nile was effectively given to the Shilluk in the Western Upper Nile State (it changed its name to Fashoda State in August 2016),894 the contested east bank for the Nile, areas of which have been historically inhabited and claimed by both the Shilluk and the Dinka, was effectively given to the Padang Dinka. 895 Malakal, the contested state capital, was also made part of Eastern Upper Nile State. In July 2015, during the peace negotiations, the Padang Dinka community had put forward a position paper to IGAD opposing the proposed power sharing which gave the SPLM/A-IO the right to appoint the governorships of Upper Nile and Unity States. They instead advocated for the creation of two states for their people: Ruweng State and Central Upper Nile. In the proposal, they stated: “it is a plain fact that all the major-oil fields in Paloch, in Upper Nile State and Unity State are all within the Padang Community’s Territories. […] We do not therefore understand the criterion used by IGAD Mediation to grant Riek Machar the rule of Upper Nile.”896 See e.g. Sudan Tribune, “Unity state authorities welcome creation of 28 states in S. Sudan”, 6 October 2018. Stimson Center, “Briefing Note: The 28 States System in South Sudan”, 9 August 2016. 892 Human Security Baseline Assessment, “The Conflict in Unity State”, Small Arms Survey, 23 February 2016. 893 Human Security Baseline Assessment, “The Conflict in Unity State”, Small Arms Survey, 23 February 2016. 894 Radio Tamazuj, “Western Nile changes name to Fashoda state”, 30 August 2016. 895 Confidential Document, ERN D103541-D103597; Human Security Baseline Assessment, “Conflict in the Upper Nile”, Small Arms Survey, 8 March 2016. 896 Padang Community Position on IGAD Proposed ‘Key Provisions and Justification for the Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan”, 22 July 2015, in ERN D103051-D103075. 890 891 118