A/HRC/40/CRP.1 primary importance, and is one of the stated goals of the new peace agreement. Indeed, the June 2018 Khartoum Declaration devoted one of the five operational paragraphs of the ceasefire agreement to the issue of rehabilitating the oil fields in Unity State.1122 Given the nature of the landscape of Unity State, the shortage of effective fighting forces within all warring factions, and the immense logistical challenges that complicate their ability to sustain the operational capacity of their forces, there has been little appetite or ability on the part of the SPLA to permanently hold large swathes of rural territory. 1123 Indeed, this has been the prevailing logic during the conflict and throughout South Sudan. Thus, the SPLA maintains strong outposts in the main towns and important locations, with limited patrolling in and around those places. The towns of Leer and Koch are good examples of this phenomena.1124 Although the outlying countryside is often referred to as being controlled by the SPLA-IO, it is in fact more of a no-man’s land, in that nobody holds it securely and permanently as the SPLA-IO favours the hit and run tactics of an insurgency group.1125 Until such time as an SPLA force moves into this territory, the SPLA-IO (RM) and the civilian population, enjoy a certain freedom of movement, and generally speaking the SPLA moves around cautiously and in strength for fear of falling into an SPLA-IO (RM) ambush.1126 When they venture out, caution would requires that the SPLA leave sufficient forces in their bases to deter or defeat any counter-attack that the SPLA-IO (RM) may launch against what would be perceived as a temporarily weaker target. As a result of this, to launch offensives, the SPLA has made use of armed youth militias, over which they have exercised general control and provided ammunition and training, to undertake their offensives in southern Unity. 2. Southern Unity Offensive, April to June 2018 Southern Unity State has remained turbulent despite the signing of the Agreement on Cessation of Hostilities on 21 December 2017. Indeed, only three days after the signing of Agreement, on 24 December, the SPLA-IO (RM) attacked Koch with the aim of displacing the SPLA’s hold on the town. CTSAMM’s investigation of the event found that 15 people, including 3 children, were killed in the attack and 26 wounded.1127 With the High Level Revitalization Forum relaunching peace negotiations in February 2018 raising the likelihood of a permanent ceasefire, incentives increased to gain control of territory before any such ceasefire came into effect.1128 This coincided with the arrival of the dry season making new offensives possible. On 27 February 2018, the SPLA sent a new Divisional Commander to 4 Division to Bentiu.1129 Two weeks later, in mid-March, he undertook a tour of the areas and sub-units under his command.1130 On 7 March, the Governor of Northern Liech State returned to Bentiu after a long absence.1131 Shortly thereafter, preparations for a major offensive began. In the first weeks of March 2018, there were reports of massive recruitment of youth into the SPLA-IO (TD) ranks in Guit and Koch Counties as well as into youth militia in Koch County controlled by the Gany County Commissioner (formerly the Koch County Commissioner).1132 Multiple witnesses described the recruitment of youth, particularly from the Jagei Nuer community into the youth militias headed by the Gany County Commissioner.1133 They described how he told the youth he recruited that their payment would be in the form of keeping any cows 1122 Khartoum Declaration, 27 June 2018, para. 5. Confidential Meetings, Bentiu, 22 and 23 September 2018. 1124 Confidential Meetings, Bentiu, 22 and 23 September 2018. 1125 Confidential Meetings, Bentiu, 22 and 23 September 2018. 1126 Confidential Meetings, Bentiu, 22 and 23 September 2018. 1127 CTSAMM, Report 2018/05: Violations of the ACOH: Fighting in Koch, 15 January 2018; Witness 823, ERN 101653-101658. 1128 Confidential Meeting, Juba, 5 November 2018; Confidential Meeting, Juba, 31 October 2018. 1129 Confidential Document, ERN D115172-D115328. 1130 Confidential Document, ERN D112933-D113082, pp. D112995, D113007. 1131 Confidential Document, ERN D112933-D113082, p. D112965; Confidential Document, ERN D114148-D114260. 1132 Confidential Document, ERN D112933-D113082, p. D112938. 1133 Gany County was created out of a section of Koch County and the former Koch County Commissioner was appointed as the Commissioner of Gany County but remained largely based in Koch. 1123 143