A/HRC/16/37 encouraged the Council to conduct a study about the interpretation of human rights in different cultures. 10. According to Ms. Narochnitskaya, the very notion of human rights, and the idea that the authority of public officials was bound by legal, traditional and ethical norms could be found in the Greco-Christian concept of natural law and, as such, could be considered traditional. She observed that traditional Christian values, which underscored the value of human dignity, could be identified in several current human rights standards, such as the prohibition of slavery. At the same time, many regimes responsible for gross violations of human rights in the twentieth century overtly declared themselves “anti–traditional”. She also affirmed that the birth of both the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the European Convention on Human Rights were attempts to give new impetus to values that were deeply rooted in tradition. 11. Ensuring human rights required the protection, not the elimination, of traditional institutions such as the State, the community and the family. Attachment to traditional values was important to ensure that respect for human rights was based not only on fear of legal punishment but also on deeply grounded convictions. Tradition could be one of the best teachers because it influenced behaviour internally and without coercion. Ms. Narochnitskaya warned about the dangers of axiological nihilism and the loss of spiritual inclinations. She therefore advocated for a restoration of the link between human rights and traditional moral values. B. Human dignity and equality 12. The second panel focused on human dignity and equality as values underpinning human rights, which could be traced in various traditions and cultures. The first panellist, Eckart Klein, law professor at the University of Potsdam, Germany, and former member of the Human Rights Committee, offered a thorough overview of the meaning of the concept of equality in human dignity in international human rights instruments. 13. Mr. Klein pointed out that universal human rights instruments did not frame human dignity as a separate human right, but considered that the recognition of equal and inalienable human rights derived from the inherent human dignity of human beings. Human rights instruments offered indications for the justification of this assertion: the need for the recognition and protection of human rights lay in the reaction against “barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind”. Human dignity was not defined in human rights instruments. Furthermore, no specific endorsement of a single philosophical, anthropological or religious approach was made by human rights instruments; thus, the recognition of human dignity stood as a founding value, without endorsement of any particular line of justification. 14. Mr. Klein noted the evolution of the place assigned to human dignity in relation to human rights. While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 regarded human dignity as an undisputed value that was attributed to the human family, it was the Covenants of 1966 that asserted that human rights derive from human dignity. Human dignity could be conceived as a foundational value of human rights, and thus as a parameter that should guide the interpretation of legally recognized human rights. This was not a superfluous notion, as there was an important relationship between the legitimacy of legal norms and their ethical underpinnings. Moreover, foundational values could also offer guidance when there was a need to interpret the scope of human rights and the acceptability of their limitation or restriction. 15. Several conclusions flowed from the assertion of human dignity as a basis for human rights. Firstly, it required the recognition of human beings as right holders and right 5