A/HRC/21/50 and Idlib governorates, and the Northern Aleppo countryside. During many of these operations, large numbers of fighters and civilians were killed. 6. According to testimonies received by the commission, Shabbiha, continues to act alongside Government forces in security and military operations. With the increased militarization of the crisis, Shabbiha has supported army units by conducting raids and clearing operations once Government forces re-established control of targeted localities. Nevertheless, the composition, strength, and level of involvement of this militia remain opaque. The role of Syrian authorities in supporting this militia could not be ascertained with a sufficient degree of certainty. In part, this difficulty stems from the diverse use of the term ―Shabbiha‖. Many of those interviewed by the commission use the term to refer to any armed individual dressed in civilian clothes or in mixed civilian and military clothes. Others report that, in some areas, the Shabbiha are composed of civilians of neighbouring villages predominantly populated by Alawites. Some interviewees claim that Shabbiha are organised, trained and paid by central or regional authorities, while others have stated they are local volunteers, with loyalties to the Government arising from ethnicity and/or a fear of the consequences of the fall of Government on them and their families. While it is evident that Shabbiha act in concert with Government forces, their precise nature and the relationship between the Shabbiha and the Government remains unclear. 7. Government forces faced increased attrition in personnel and equipment due to combat operations, defections and casualties. While the number and level of defections are not yet having an operational impact, they had a psychological effect on the troops, thus fuelling a crisis of confidence within the ranks and encouraging further defections. Defections continued steadily but reach their peaks particularly in the aftermath of military operations. The Government also faced difficulties in drafting new recruits; as those called in for mandatory military service refuse to report. This situation forced the leadership to extend the conscription of those already serving in the ranks which, in turn, has created frustration and further defections among them. II. Anti-Government armed groups 8. During the reporting period, anti-Government armed groups continued to engage with Government forces through direct clashes and ambushes, the use of Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) and raids on military/security facilities. 9. Despite the apparent absence of an overall effective command structure, the FSA continued to ―represent‖ the main anti-Government armed group with a significant number of groups claiming affiliation to it. The FSA has created Local Military Councils in specific governorates which claim leadership over fighting groups operating in each of those areas. High-ranking defectors within the FSA have also announced the creation of a new command structure, namely the Joint Military Command of the Syrian Revolution, in charge of organizing and unifying all armed groups, coordinating military activities with political partners and managing security and stability in the transitional period. 10. Anti-Government armed groups vary in terms of capabilities, composition and tactics. At one end of the spectrum, there are small groups operating at the local level, mainly composed of civilians and defectors from the area, and often eluding direct confrontations with Government forces by temporarily withdrawing from their villages during army raids. Such groups mainly use IEDs attacks, overnight raids and low scale ambushes on small military units and facilities. On the other end, there are increasingly larger groups that have succeeded in integrating a number of smaller groups, and which are able to control some territory, directly confront army units in urban environment for days and conduct coordinated attacks on army positions and large convoys. The longer these 61