A/HRC/21/50 dozens of cases of looting of property, including of money, vehicles, jewellery and electrical goods. 127. Those interviewed indicated that searches, and thus the pillaging, burning and destruction of property, targeted groups and individuals who appeared to be defectors, members of anti-Government armed groups, demonstrators, and family members of the aforementioned. In particular, family members of defectors described how their homes, farms and shops were burned. In some instances, the looting, burning and destruction of property appeared to be directed at entire communities rather than at specific individuals. 128. According to soldiers who later defected, the looting and burning of property of opposition activists and defectors was intended to, inter alia, impose financial constraints on them and their activities. Government soldiers and Shabbiha also benefited from these acts financially, conducting them with complete impunity. 129. There are reasonable grounds to believe that Government forces and Shabbiha members committed the war crime of pillage. The commission also determined that Government forces and Shabbiha members engaged in the destruction and burning of property during house searches. 2. Anti-Government armed groups 130. The commission received no reports of the pillaging or destruction of property by anti-Government armed groups, but lack of access to Syrian Arab Republic hampered investigations. The Government provided information relating to crimes allegedly perpetrated by anti-Government armed groups, including looting and vehicle theft, which the commission was unable to corroborate. Consequently, the commission was unable to reach any findings regarding the alleged pillaging, burning and destruction of property by anti-Government armed groups. IV. Responsibility 131. The commission finds reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity, breaches of international humanitarian law and gross human rights violations have been committed in the Syrian Arab Republic. The commission endeavoured, where possible, to identify individuals in leadership positions who may be responsible. In March, the commission handed over to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights confidential lists of suspected individuals and units.25 Further lists will be provided at the close of its current mandate, in September 2012. A. State responsibility 132. The evidence collected confirmed the commission‘s previous finding that violations had been committed pursuant to State policy. Large-scale operations conducted in different governorates, their similar modus operandi, their complexity and integrated military/security apparatus indicate involvement at the highest levels of the armed and security forces and the Government. 133. Eyewitnesses consistently identified the Shabbiha as perpetrators of many of the crimes described in the present report. Although the nature, composition, hierarchy and structure of this group remains opaque, credible information led to the conclusion that 25 A/HRC/19/69, para. 87. 21