A/HRC/11/31 page 5 between international human rights law and international humanitarian law, including the complementary and mutually reinforcing application of human rights law and international humanitarian law; the question of lex specialis; the issues arising from the application of article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and other rights of particular relevance. The High Commissioner referred to the list of non-derogable rights included in the International Covenant. Beyond that, however, she invited experts to consider other rights of particular relevance, including in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, for instance, the discussion on the rights of those persons detained in the context of armed conflict and the extent of judicial guarantees that should be provided to them, as well as the question of how to articulate access to food, medicine and shelter as rights during a situation of armed conflict. International criminal law had much to offer in that direction, particularly when it considered that deprivation of access to food and medicine may constitute, under certain circumstances, an international crime. Lastly, on the question of implementation and monitoring of human rights obligations in situations of armed conflict and the issue of accountability for violations, the High Commissioner indicated that this was the era for accountability and that the protection of human rights was significantly advanced when individuals were held to account for their acts. 8. Professor Georges Abi-Saab introduced the meeting by recalling the history of the evolution of the notion of protection of civilians. He indicated that, in 1968, the General Assembly, in its resolution 2444 (XXIII), invited the Secretary-General to, inter alia, study possible steps to secure the better application of existing protections in all armed conflicts. Several reports thereon were submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly. Professor Abi-Saab also recalled that, more recently, the Commission on Human Rights acknowledged, in its resolution 2005/63, that human rights law and international humanitarian law were mutually reinforcing, and considered that the protection provided by human rights law continued in armed conflict situations, taking into account when international humanitarian law applied as lex specialis. The Subcommission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights took up the issue at its fifty-sixth session. A working paper on the relationship between human rights law and international humanitarian law was submitted at the fifty-seventh session dealing with the same issue, particularly from the perspective of their complementary application in the light of the practice of human rights treaty bodies and special procedures. Professor Abi-Saab also highlighted that the Human Rights Committee, in its general comments Nos. 29 (2001) and 31 (2004), dealt with the questions of the applicability of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in situations of armed conflict, and recalled that the human rights obligations contained therein applied in situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law were applicable. Furthermore, the International Court of Justice, in its Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and The wall advisory opinions, as well as in the Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda case, also dealt with the question of the complementary application of international human rights law and international humanitarian law in situations of armed conflict. Lastly, Professor Abi-Saab pointed out that, in its resolution 9/9, the Council acknowledged that human rights law and international humanitarian law were complementary and mutually reinforcing, that all human rights require protection equally and that the protection provided by human rights law continued in armed conflict situations, taking into account when international humanitarian law applied as lex specialis. The Council also underlined the exceptional and temporary nature of derogations to human rights obligations and