A/HRC/26/44 V. Human rights concerns A. Independence of the judiciary 33. In November 2013, Presidential Decree No. 6 on improving the judicial system of the Republic of Belarus was adopted. This saw some positive institutional developments: the merger of the Supreme Court and the Supreme Economic Court, with the functions of the latter transferred from the Ministry of Justice to the former, the abolishment of military courts and the removal of all district courts from the jurisdiction of the Department of Justice to that of regional courts. It is still too early to assess the impact of the Decree. It is hoped that it will bring some independence to the judiciary from the executive, and a more consistent interpretation and application of the law. However, the President remains directly responsible for appointing, dismissing and determining the tenure of judges. 34. In cases where the authorities are found to be responsible for a human rights violation, practice shows that courts rarely award non-pecuniary compensation for damages. Although the obligation to prove the legality of the action lies with the authorities against which the claim was filed,9 court decisions often argue that it is the applicant who must prove that the authorities acted unlawfully. 35. Of particular note is that criminal cases retain an accusatory bias, as recognized by the Supreme Court in its reviews.10 Judicial practice still presumes the credibility of the testimony of a police officer, despite the removal of this provision in 2007 from the amended law on internal affairs agencies. 36. The Special Rapporteur again emphasizes his concern at the lack of independence of the judiciary, which is inconsistent with an environment necessary for the exercise of human rights (E/C.12/1/Add.7/Rev.1, para 12). For many years, the United Nations human rights mechanisms have expressed that procedures relating to the appointment, tenure, disciplining and dismissal of judges do not comply with the principle of independence and impartiality of the judiciary.11 There also seems to be a failure on the part of the executive to respect the decision of the Constitutional Court and thereby observe the rule of law.12 B. Independence of lawyers 37. The United Nations human rights mechanisms have repeatedly called on Belarus to respond to concerns of defence lawyers and address the pattern of intimidation against lawyers and of interference in their work (A/HRC/15/16, paras. 50 and 98.26). The continued failure to address this issue has a chilling effect on the independence of lawyers.13 Like other Special Procedures mandate holders, the Special Rapporteur is concerned by the frequent targeting of lawyers who work on human rights cases.14 He 9 10 11 12 13 14 Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, Article 60 (http://www.belarus.net/costitut/constitution_e.htm#Article%2060). http://court.by.justice_RB/ik/obzor/2010/e439740565c86a62.html. CCPR/C/79/Add.86, para. 13; E/C.12/BLR/CO/4-6, para. 6; CAT/C/BLR/CO/4, para. 12; E/CN.4/2001/65/Add.1, paras 106–114; E/CN.4/2005/6/Add.3, para. 44; E/CN.4/2005/35, paras. 29–31; A/HRC/23/52, para. 61; A/68/276, para. 83. CCPR/C/79/Add.86, para. 13; E/CN.4/2001/65/Add.1, paras. 29–3; A/HRC/4/16, para. 14. CAT/C/BLR/CO/4, para. 12(a); A/HRC/17/30/Add.1, para. 101; A/HRC/20/8, para. 75(i); A/HRC/23/52, para. 64; A/68/276, para. 76; A/HRC/25/55/Add.3, para. 61. E/CN.4/2001/65/Add.1, para. 117; A/68/276, para. 97. 7