A/HRC/34/57 in developed countries”,68 while working time and workers’ representation laws appeared to have negative effects on unemployment.69 45. The claim that employment protection legislation harms youth unemployment in particular has been challenged by recent research. For example, reducing costs to lay off workers neither increases young people’s chances of finding employment nor decreases the risk of being unemployed.70 46. Other studies have identified positive effects of labour standards on productivity and employment. There is a positive long-term relationship of labour legislation, including regulation protecting workers against dismissal with productivity. 71 Also, fewer working hours per day reportedly correlates with higher productivity per hour. 72 There have been similar findings regarding the impact of certain labour laws on innovation. An analysis of four OECD countries between 1970 and 2002 found that higher dismissal protection standards had a positive effect on innovations realized by employees. 73 47. With regard to developing countries, evidence of a negative impact of labour standards on a country’s economic performance appears to be weak. While relevant data on developing countries is scarce, research on Argentina, for example, suggests that labour market deregulation seems to have reduced employment elasticities instead of increasing them. 74 Meanwhile, evidence on Chile shows that “gradual re-regulation of the labour market was consistent with continued employment growth up to the Asian Financial Crisis” in the late 1990s.75 A study analysing data on various countries from 1985 to 1994 found that higher labour standards correlated with lower levels of corruption, among other positive effects.76 Finally, a study on BRICS — Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa — suggested that relevant strike laws had no significant effects on unemployment, while more protective employee representation laws were, in part, even negatively correlated with unemployment.77 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 16 Ibid., italics by authors. Simon Deakin, Jonas Malmberg and Prabirjit Sarkar, “How do labour laws affect unemployment and the labour share of national income? The experience of six OECD countries, 1970-2010”, International Labour Review, vol. 153, No. 1 (2014), p. 17. See Clemens Noelke, “The consequences of employment protection legislation for the youth labour market”, Working Paper No. 144 (Mannheim, Mannheimer Zentrum für Europäische Sozialforschung, 2011), p. 26. Simon Deakin and Prabirjit Sarkar, “Does labour regulation improve income distribution at the cost of decreased employment and productivity?”, Paper presented at the ILO/IZA Conference, Geneva, 10-11 March 2016. See Lonnie Golden, “The effects of working time on productivity and firm performance: a research synthesis paper”, Conditions of Work and Employment Series No. 33 (ILO Geneva, 2011), p. 6 with further references. Viral V. Acharya, Ramin P. Baghai, Krishnamurthy V. Subramanian, “LaborlLaws and innovation”, Journal of Law & Economics, vol. 56, No. 4 (2013), pp. 998 and 1032. Adriana Marshall, “Labour market policies and regulations in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico: programmes and impacts”, Employment Strategy Papers No. 2004/13 (ILO, 2004), p. 22. Gerry Rodgers, “Labour market flexibility and decent work”, Department of Economic and Social Affairs Working Paper No. 47 (July 2007), p. 6 with further references. Thomas I. Palley, “Labour standards, democracy and wages: some cross-country evidence”, Journal of International Development, vol. 17, No. 7 (2005), pp. 885 and 889. Simon Deakin, Colin Fenwick, Prabirjit Sarkar, “Labour law and inclusive development: the economic effects of industrial relations laws in middle-income countries”, in M. Schmiegelow and H. Schmiegelow, eds. Institutional Competition between Common Law and Civil Law, (Berlin/Heidelberg, Springer, 2014), p. 202.