A/HRC/40/59 even “disappearing” or otherwise suppressing anti-corruption activists (e.g. A/70/217, paras. 69–70; and CAT/C/THA/CO/1, para. (14) (b)). 33. In all of these examples, acts or threats of torture or ill-treatment supply the coercive element compelling victims or their relatives to offer or contribute to the requested undue advantage and, therefore, constitute an instrumental part of the related act or scheme of corruption. Given that a primary driver for this pattern of torture and ill-treatment is the pursuit of an undue advantage, such abuse cannot be addressed only through improvements in regulation, training or equipment, or through the investigation and prosecution of individual acts of torture and ill-treatment, all of which presuppose a functioning governance system based on the rule of law. Rather, the deliberate instrumentalization of torture and ill-treatment for corrupt purposes can only be eradicated through decisive and simultaneous action towards purging the overarching corrupt environment as a whole, including widespread root causes of corruption such as inadequate remuneration of public sector employees (CAT/C/52/2, paras. 84, 89–90 and 94) and the inadequate resourcing of public bodies more generally, the perceived normalization of corruption within State institutions, and the absence of accessible, independent and sufficiently staffed and funded monitoring, oversight and complaints mechanisms capable of detecting, investigating, prosecuting and compelling reform towards the non-recurrence of both corruption and torture or ill-treatment. 3. Instrumentalizing “undue advantages” for torture or ill-treatment 34. The direct causal link between corruption and torture or ill-treatment can also be inverse, that is where undue advantages are deliberately offered or sought for the purpose of inducing acts or threats of torture or ill-treatment, or to protect such abuses from investigation and adjudication. For example, in practice, police officers may be offered money, drugs and other undue advantages in return for intimidating, punishing or coercing persons on behalf of criminal networks or, conversely, criminals may be offered such advantages in order to intimidate, punish or coerce victims, witnesses, political opponents or human rights defenders on behalf of corrupt officials (e.g. A/70/217, para. 70). Similarly, in the migration context, smuggling networks often bribe border officials in order for them to intimidate and ill-treat migrants caught crossing the border without having solicited smuggling services (A/HRC/37/50, para. 30). In the prison context, dominant inmates may be offered undue advantages in return for agreeing to intimidate, punish or coerce other inmates on behalf of the prison guards (CAT/OP/MLI/1, para. 82). 35. An important dimension of this interactive pattern is corruption whose purpose is to “protect” the practice of torture or ill-treatment, most notably by obstructing or interfering with oversight mechanisms or the judicial system. This may include a variety of actions, including: (a) bribery of witnesses or public officials as a means of preventing or obstructing an investigation, prosecution or other aspect of the justice process in relation to torture and ill-treatment; (b) State officials trading in influence in order to obstruct investigations, prosecutions and other aspects of the justice process in relation to torture and ill-treatment; (c) State officials condoning, through inaction or inadequate measures, abuse inflicted by private individuals, corporations and other non-State actors in return for financial, political or other undue advantages being granted to them or any other person or entity, including their own Government. The Special Rapporteur has received numerous and consistent allegations according to which police and other security forces were, in various contexts, reluctant to protect indigenous and other socioeconomically marginalized communities against violence at the hands of corporate actors and other private individuals aiming to take possession of their lands for purposes such as extraction of natural resources, deforestation, or the construction of settlements, dams or other infrastructure projects (A/73/207, paras. 64–65). Similarly, in custodial contexts, officials are frequently reported to turn a blind eye to violence inflicted by dominant inmates in return for bribes and other undue advantages. It must be emphasized that any such conduct of State officials amounts to consent or acquiescence to torture or ill-treatment perpetrated by non-State actors and, at the very least, violates the due diligence obligation of States to prevent, investigate and prosecute such abuse. 10