A/HRC/27/47 restricted or derogated from in the context of public emergencies or armed conflict. Relying on the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice and on the Human Rights Committee’s general comment No. 29 in which it is stated that “procedural safeguards may never be made subject to measures that would circumvent the protection of non-derogable rights”, it determined that the main elements of article 9 of the Covenant, such as habeas corpus, must be fully respected even during states of emergency (E/CN.4/2006/120, para. 14). 3. Non-derogability and counter-terrorism measures 28. The Working Group has expressed its concern about the frequent use of various forms of administrative detention, entailing restrictions on fundamental rights (E/CN.4/2005/6, para. 61). It has noted a further expansion of some States’ recourse to emergency legislation diluting the right of habeas corpus or amparo and limiting the fundamental rights of persons detained in the context of the fight against terrorism by means of new anti-terror or internal security legislation allowing detention for an unlimited time or for very long periods, without charge, without the detainees being brought before a judge, and without a remedy to challenge the legality of the detention (ibid.). The Working Group has observed that this kind of administrative detention, which often is also secret, aims at circumventing the legal time limits governing police custody and pretrial detention and at depriving the persons concerned of the judicial guarantees recognized to all persons suspected or accused of having committed an offence (ibid.). 29. Although it is acknowledged that counter-terrorism measures might require the adoption of specific measures limiting certain guarantees, including those relating to detention and the right to a fair trial, in a very limited manner, the Working Group has repeatedly stressed that in all circumstances deprivation of liberty must remain consistent with the norms of international law (E/CN.4/2004/3, para. 84). The right of anyone deprived of his or her liberty to bring proceedings before a court in order to challenge the legality of the detention is a personal right, which must “in all circumstances be guaranteed by the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts” (ibid., para. 85). 30. In numerous cases presented before it in recent years, as well as through information received from non-governmental organizations working in the field and national human rights institutions, the Working Group has noticed the continued practice by some States of using deprivation of liberty without charges or trial or other applicable procedural guarantees against persons accused of terrorist acts, contrary to international human rights instruments (A/HRC/10/21, para 52). The Working Group has adopted a list of principles based on articles 9 and 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and on articles 9 and 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ibid., para. 53). These principles guarantee that persons detained under charges of terrorist activities shall enjoy the effective right to habeas corpus following their detention. The exercise of the right to habeas corpus does not impede on the obligation of the law enforcement authority responsible for the decision for detention or maintaining the detention, to present the detained person before a competent and independent judicial authority within a reasonable time period (ibid., para. 54 (f)). 31. In the report on the situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay (E/CN.4/2006/120), the group of special rapporteurs recalled the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice on the complementarity of international humanitarian law and human rights law as well as the affirmation by the Human Rights Committee in its general comment No. 31 (2004). The group of special rapporteurs stated that “international obligations regarding the struggle against terrorism might make the apprehension and detention of some of these persons a duty for all States” (ibid., para. 26). Drawing on its finding that such deprivation of liberty is governed by human rights law, and specifically articles 9 and 14 of the 10