A/HRC/4/20 page 7 juvenile death penalty has been specifically abolished in virtually every other country. If the Council is to take seriously its responsibilities in relation to extrajudicial executions, it will respond appropriately to this wholly unacceptable situation. III. ISSUES OF PARTICULAR IMPORTANCE A. The mandate of the Special Rapporteur in armed conflicts 18. An earlier report examined the law applicable to violations of the right to life in armed conflict and the role of the Special Rapporteur in response thereto.6 This view has, however, been consistently rejected by one State. These objections, by the United States of America, have been raised in a wide range of contexts, thus underscoring the importance of carefully examining their validity. In essence, the United States position consists of four propositions: (a) the “war on terror” constitutes an armed conflict to which international humanitarian law applies; (b) international humanitarian law operates to the exclusion of human rights law; (c) international humanitarian law falls outside the mandate of the Special Rapporteur and of the Council; and (d) States may determine for themselves whether an individual incident is governed by humanitarian law or human rights law.7 If accepted, these propositions would have far-reaching consequences for the Council and for its ability to contribute in any way to many of the situations that are currently most prominent on its agenda. 1. The alleged exclusivity of the two bodies of law 19. Contrary to this proposition, it is widely agreed that the two bodies of law, far from being mutually exclusive, are complementary. The International Court of Justice has observed that the test of what is an arbitrary deprivation of life in the context of hostilities “falls to be determined by the applicable lex specialis, namely, the law applicable in armed conflict which is designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities”.8 But it went on to clarify that “the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation …”.9 In Congo v. Uganda, for example, it found separate violations of international humanitarian law and human rights law, thus conclusively underscoring the fact that the former does not wholly replace the latter during an armed conflict.10 This is consistent with the conclusion of the Human Rights Committee that while “more specific rules of international humanitarian law may be specially relevant for the purposes of the interpretation of [certain] Covenant rights, both spheres of law are complementary, not mutually exclusive”.11 Similarly, the Commission and the General Assembly have regularly reaffirmed “that international human rights law and international humanitarian law are complementary and not mutually exclusive”.12 2. Humanitarian law in the Commission’s mandate 20. The Commission on Human Rights, with the consistent endorsement of the Economic and Social Council, regularly treated international humanitarian law as falling within its terms of reference. Examples of this practice abound,13 and it suffices to cite three examples. First, in relation to the former Yugoslavia, the Commission, in 1992, “call[ed] upon all parties … to ensure full respect for … humanitarian law”14 and “[r]emind[ed] all parties that they are bound to comply with their obligations under international humanitarian law …”.15 This resolution was subsequently endorsed by the Economic and Social Council.16