A/HRC/40/61 60. A wide range of options are available to States to ensure such accountability. In some constitutions, the right to housing applies directly to private actors, allowing access to effective remedies where actions of landlords, banks and financial actors undermine this right. 87 In others, where constitutional obligations are restricted to Governments, constitutional litigation may require Governments to impose necessary regulations. Privatization should also be subject to judicial review when it is contrary to the progressive realization of the right to housing.88 61. The barriers facing claimants seeking to hold corporate actors accountable, however, are often insurmountable. Complex corporate structures and veils are prevalent among investors in housing and are difficult to pierce. There is no “equality of arms” between lowincome communities and massive private equity firms. The Special Rapporteur has heard directly from tenants in multiple countries dealing with the same transnational private equity firms acting as remote landlords. All have common complaints but nowhere to go for hearings. 62. Where private investors have been provided with development assistance, access to justice may be provided by way of complaints procedures through the relevant international financial institutions. The Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman for private sector lending through the World Bank has investigated several complaints related to housing, including when an investor failed to consider the rights of current residents in a development project. 89 By and large, however, international financial institutions have failed to implement meaningful accountability or access to justice for the right to housing. 90 63. Under the “third pillar” of the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – the responsibility to ensure access to effective remedies – it is proposed that effective remedies be put in place for human rights violations through a combination of judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, all of which must comply with standards of independence, fairness, transparency and legitimacy.91 Stakeholders should be able to raise concerns related to accountability to human rights and “remediation of adverse human rights impacts”. Mechanisms must be developed collaboratively and must be trusted by stakeholder groups and must be procedurally fair, provide adequate assistance to enable full participation, and include clear time frames and monitoring of remedies. They must ensure access to information, independent advice and expertise, and facilitate engagement and dialogue. Most importantly, they must ensure that outcomes and remedies accord with the right to housing and other internationally recognized human rights. 64. If such mechanisms are properly focused on ensuring compliance with the right to housing, they may play an important role in ensuring access to justice in the context of private housing development and management. However, it is important that human rights obligations of States not be confused with corporate responsibility: it is the obligation of States to regulate private actors and to ensure access to justice when the actions of private actors result in a violation of the right to housing. Compliance with the right to housing cannot rely on voluntary commitments or mediated settlements. Where necessary, States should impose obligations on private actors to facilitate access to justice. Just as housing developers may be required to adopt measures to protect the environment or to accommodate disability, they may also be required, through legislation, to provide for independent adjudication of human rights complaints, legal assistance for residents, and independent monitoring and oversight of implementation of remedies. 87 88 89 90 91 See Aoife Nolan, “Holding non-state actors to account for constitutional economic and social rights violations: experiences and lessons from South Africa and Ireland”, International Journal of Constitutional Law, vol. 12, Issue 1 (January 2014), pp. 61–93. See https://www.eldiario.es/madrid/Ana-Botella-Gobierno-condenados-millones-venta-viviendafondos-buitre_0_851114898.html. See Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, Belarus/Strominvest II-01/Minsk, case filed on 24 March 2016; see also South Africa/Lonmin-02/Marikana, case filed on 16 June 2015; and Guinea/Nedbank01/Kintinian, case filed on 27 April 2017. A/73/310/Rev.1, paras. 101–102. Principles 25–31. 17