A/HRC/41/36 (a) Whether there are credible threats that are objectively verifiable; in other words, whether they are supported by reference to a range of sources of information; (b) Whether the perpetrators have the intention to implement their threats, whether they are in a position, including physical proximity, and have the capabilities to carry out the threats; (c) Whether the risk is immediate, meaning continuing and soon; (d) Whether the identity of the victim places the victim in specific situations of vulnerability or risk; (e) Whether there are patterns of violence against groups of individuals by virtue of their identities. 39. The normative and practical implication is that States must be particularly aware of the vulnerabilities of some individuals whose lives may be particularly at risk because of their activities or their identity. As highlighted by the Human Rights Committee, such individuals include “human rights defenders, officials fighting corruption and organized crime, humanitarian workers, journalists, prominent public figures, witnesses to crime and victims of domestic and gender-based violence and human trafficking”. 22 40. Crucially, as repeatedly highlighted by women journalists and human rights defenders, along with human rights experts and special procedure mandate holders, the assessment of risks of harm must be gender-sensitive and intersectional.23 B. Responsibility to protect against actions by other States 41. Although the responsibility to protect has been invoked largely in response to threats originating from private persons and entities (for example, in the context of preventing domestic violence and femicide), it may also be invoked against threats by other States, international organizations and foreign corporations operating within the territory of a State or in other areas subject to their jurisdiction.24 42. That recognition is particularly important in view of the patterns of the extraterritorial outreach of States for the purpose of human rights violations, including the right to life, but also the right to freedom of expression or privacy through surveillance and harassment. 43. The extraterritorial use of force is defined in the present report as the use of potentially lethal force by a State against an individual or a group of individuals located on the territory of another State. Extraterritorial use of force is not a new phenomenon. It has been repeatedly invoked in the name of self-defence and countering terrorism and is the object of many legal analyses which are beyond the focus of the present report. 25 Previous Special Rapporteurs on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions have thoroughly analysed the extraterritorial use of force, including targeted killings through drones. 26 For the purpose of the present report on the responsibility to protect and warn, the Special Rapporteur highlights the following aspects of extraterritorial use of force. 44. First, it is important to highlight and insist that Article 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law prohibit the threat or use of inter-State force, subject to limited exceptions: consent and self-defence. A State may consent to the use of force on its territory by another State, while the Charter allows action taken in selfdefence. 22 23 24 25 26 Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36, para. 23. See, for example, A/HRC/40/60 and A/72/290. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36, para. 22. For an in-depth review of the jurisprudence, State positions and academic literature, see, for example: Noam Lubell, Extraterritorial Use of Force Against Non-State Actors (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2010); and Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights and Personal Self-Defense in International Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2017). See, for example, A/68/382 and A/HRC/14/24/Add.6. 9