A/HRC/41/36 State whose right to life is nonetheless affected by its military or other activities in a direct and reasonably foreseeable manner. 32 50. This analysis of the responsibility to protect the right to life is in keeping with developments with regard to the protection of economic rights, where it has been determined that extraterritorial obligations arise when a State party may influence situations located outside its territory, consistent with the limits imposed by international law, by controlling the activities of corporations domiciled in its territory and/or under its jurisdiction, and thus may contribute to the effective enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights outside its national territory, 33 and to the protection of children’s rights. 34 51. As emphasized by Marko Milanovic, the Human Rights Committee, in its general comment No. 36, thus “shifted the focus of the jurisdictional inquiry from that of power or control over territory or over the person, to that of power or control over the enjoyment of the right to life. In doing so, the Committee effectively endorsed the functional theory of the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties”.35 52. The Special Rapporteur therefore deduces that the responsibility of a State to protect may be invoked extraterritorially in circumstances where that particular State has the capacity to protect the right to life of an individual against an immediate or foreseeable threat to his or her life. 36 53. Such understanding of the scope of the responsibility to protect is particularly relevant when applied to agencies whose mandate may have an extraterritorial scope. To the extent that such agencies perform their functions outside national borders, or that their functions concern other States, such functions should include, wherever they may reasonably do so, the protection of those whose lives are under a foreseeable threat. D. Duty to warn 54. Once a risk to life has been identified: States parties must respond urgently and effectively in order to protect individuals who find themselves under a specific threat, by adopting special measures such as the assignment of around-the-clock police protection, the issuance of protection and restraining orders against potential aggressors and, in exceptional cases, and only with the free and informed consent of the threatened individual, protective custody. 37 55. Various authoritative sources around the world have recognized a duty by law enforcement authorities to warn intended victims of threats to their safety. For instance, British police departments have responded to the aforementioned Osman v. the United 32 33 34 35 36 37 Ibid., para. 63. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, general comment No. 24 (2017), para. 28. Committee on the Rights of the Child, general comment No. 16 (2013), paras. 18–20. Marko Milanovic, “The murder of Jamal Khashoggi: immunities, inviolability and the human right to life”, Human Rights Law Review (forthcoming), p. 25; Yuval Shany, “Taking universality seriously: a functional approach to extraterritoriality in international human rights law”, Law and Ethics of Human Rights, vol. 7, No. 1 (2013), p. 47. Andrew Clapham has adopted a capacity-based approach to the human rights obligations of non-State actors. See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006). In her report on the human rights obligations of non-State actors (A/HRC/38/44), the Special Rapporteur also suggests that the obligations of armed non-State actors stem from their (uniquely located) capacities to respect or protect the human rights, including the right to life, of people over whom they have some degree of control. In addition, it is worth highlighting that the Human Rights Committee imposes on Member States a duty to protect individuals outside their territories against foreseeable threats to life by corporations headquartered on their territories. Human Rights Committee, general comment No. 36, para. 23; regional courts have further given practical meaning to the responsibility of States to protect through the enactment of protective, interim or urgent measures that States must take to avoid irreparable harm to persons or groups of persons in imminent peril. 11