A/HRC/28/59 human rights record of the country in question; information from civil society; the nature of the authoritarian regime; and the actions taken by international organizations and other Governments. Hence, a due diligence analysis to assess the impact of loans or additional loans on human rights should be viewed as a continuous process. 34. At the time lending decisions are made, a micro- and macroanalysis of the situation of the borrowing country should include the following questions: (a) Whether the money would directly serve, or be easily diverted, to finance human rights violations (for example, funding for death squads, death camps, weapons or other tools to repress or control the population); (b) Whether financial resources provided to the Government would make the regime politically stronger or extend its life; (c) Whether the loan would improve the enjoyment of economic and social rights of marginalized people, or would more likely be used to sustain clientelistic relations, or whether funding spent in the social sector would rather free government funds for repressive investments than improve the overall human rights situation. 35. Lenders should ask themselves those questions before granting any loan. Failing to exercise due diligence may not only come with considerable reputational risk. As legal standards and customs in the area of business and human rights are evolving, it cannot be ruled out that courts may start reviewing such lending decisions, even if many years later.25 IV. Do funds consolidate regimes engaged in gross violations of human rights? 36. As explained in the previous section, in theory, net lending may have a profound influence on regimes engaged in gross violations of human rights. Funds can influence regime structure and stability, as well as the choices for survival and domination of the elite of a country. However, to what extent is the theoretical, rational choice explanation of the abusive behaviour of a regime confirmed by reality? 37. It should be noted that there has been some research analysing whether lending by international financial institutions or structural adjustment programmes imposed by them have had an impact on physical integrity rights. Those studies found that World Bank and IMF adjustment programmes lowered the overall level of government respect for human rights, including physical integrity rights. 26 While some scholars have found that net World Bank and IMF lending has improved respect for human rights, their data confirms that physical integrity rights increase when payback of loans exceeds new loans, suggesting that 25 26 12 In recent civil lawsuits in Argentina, based on responsibility for financing criminal regimes, victims have sued the banks that financed the military junta between 1976 and 1983. Those cases include Ibañez Manuel Leandro y otros casos/Diligencia Preliminar, Juzgado Nacional de 1º Instancia en lo Civil 34, Buenos Aires, No. 95.019/2009; and Garramone, Andrés c. Citibank NA y otros, 2010, Juzgado Nacional en lo Contencioso Administrativo Federal N° 8, Buenos Aires, N° 47736/10. See also Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and Veerle Opgenhaffen, “The past and present of corporate complicity: financing the Argentinian dictatorship”, Harvard Human Rights Journal, vol. 23, No. 1 (October 2010). See for example M. Rodwan Abouharb and David L. Cingranelli, “The human rights effects of World Bank structural adjustment, 1981–2000,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 50, No. 2 (June 2006) and by the same authors, “IMF programs and human rights, 1981–2003”, Review of International Organizations, vol. 4, No. 1 (March 2009).