A/HRC/28/59 16. In the case of terrorism, money received by a suspect terrorist group may not have been used to actually commit an act of terrorism.12 However, that does not mean that the funding did not sustain a terror group and its terrorist acts. The issue may be more complex in relation to funding provided to States perpetrating gross violations of human rights, but the same argument can be made. 17. One would of course have to differentiate between whether funding provided to States directly finances the commission of gross violations of human rights, or maintains the general functioning and sustainability of a regime that violates human rights, and to what extent funds provided to such regimes might still be used for the realization of human rights, including social and economic rights. 13 Sometimes funds facilitate the commission of gross human rights violations in a more direct way, for example when they are used to equip intelligence services, police or other security forces with tools or weapons of repression. In many cases, financial support may rather have an indirect effect through enabling a regime that violates human rights to last longer by, for example, allowing it to fund patronage. We need to better understand when, whether and how official and private lending may contribute to gross human rights violations, in order to design and implement effective laws and policies at the national and international level aimed at minimizing the risk that financial support enables Governments or non-State actors to commit such violations. 18. With the present report, the Independent Expert intends to contribute to a better understanding of when financial support may contribute to or sustain the commission of large-scale gross human rights violations by sketching a rational choice framework premised on the incentives of authoritarian Governments and private and official lenders. As developed further below, authoritarian regimes make rational policy choices when they try to stay in power, using available funds to foster loyalty or repress opponents. Lenders also make rational calculations when deciding on loans, for which the likelihood that they will be paid back is key. Complementing the qualitative explanation, the Independent Expert will discuss the existing empirical evidence of the relationship that exists between sovereign financing, human rights practices and the consolidation of non-democratic Governments engaged in gross violations of human rights. Finally, the Independent Expert will present some interim conclusions and invite stakeholders to discuss them. The legal and policy implications of financial complicity will be discussed in a future study. III. How additional funds consolidate authoritarian regimes in most situations 19. Authoritarian regimes committing gross human rights violations are politically vulnerable because of their problems of legitimation. Such regimes endeavour to retain power and do so by securing privileges for part of the population, the elites, the military or the security apparatus, by allocating economic benefits and/or political concessions in exchange for support. To remain in power, a regime must address economic constraints in ways that secure a minimum of political support, or enable the bureaucratic or repressive machinery to function efficiently, control society or repress the population. There is a 12 13 See the discussion in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, US, 130 S .Ct. 2705 (S.C., 2010); Boim v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, 549 F.3d 685 (7th Cir. 2008); Almog et al. v. Arab Bank plc, 471F.Supp.2d 257 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); Weiss et al. v. National Westminster Bank plc, 453 F.Supp.2d 609 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F.Supp.2d 765 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); Linde v. Arab Bank plc, 384 F.Supp.2d 571 (E.D.N.Y. 2005). Those ideas have been developed by the Independent Expert in “Tracking down the missing financial link in transitional justice”, International Human Rights Law Review, vol. 1, No. 1 (2012). 7