A/HRC/40/69 XII. Legal findings 96. The Commission finds reasonable grounds to believe that SPLA, both factions of SPLA-IO and affiliated armed groups have committed serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. Such violations have included the deliberate targeting of the civilian population and individual civilians, including on the basis of their perceived political or ethnic affiliation, and by means of killings, abductions, rape and sexual violence, and the looting and destruction of villages. Further violations have included attacks against civilian objects and humanitarian assistance or peacekeeping personnel, arbitrary arrest and detention, looting and pillaging, and the conscription of children under the age of 15 years into armed forces. The Commission also finds reasonable grounds to believe that these violations and alleged crimes have resulted in the massive displacement of the civilian population of South Sudan. 97. There are also reasonable grounds to believe that the National Security Service and the SPLA Military Intelligence directorate have committed arbitrary detention, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading acts, killings, and enforced disappearance of detainees, in many cases on the basis of perceived political or ethnic affiliation. 98. These acts amount to serious violations of human rights law, including under the Transitional Constitution of South Sudan, 2011, in particular the right to life and human dignity (art. 11), the right to liberty and security of person (art. 12), the rights of the child (art. 17), the right to freedom from torture (art. 18), the right to a fair trial (ar. 19), the right to freedom of movement and residence (art. 27) and the right to property (art. 28). They also amount to equivalent violations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the Convention against Torture and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 99. These acts constitute crimes under the Penal Code Act, 2008, including murder (sect. 206), criminal force (sect. 224), rape (sect. 247), wrongful confinement (sect. 284), theft (sect. 293) and mischief with intent to destroy house (sect. 324), and violate fair trial rights under the Code of Criminal Procedure Act, 2008. Moreover, SPLA soldiers are subject to the provisions of the Sudan People’s Liberation Army Act, 2009, in particular section 57, which establishes the offences of destroying and damaging property, plundering and committing any offence against the property or person of any inhabitant or resident of a country in which he or she is serving. 100. The Commission finds that all parties to the conflict have violated their obligation to distinguish at all times between civilian objects and military objectives. There have been violations of the principle of precaution, which demands that, in the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare civilians and civilian objects. 101. Furthermore, in relation to each of the incidents examined, the Commission finds reasonable grounds to believe that there was a nexus between the commission of the crimes and the ongoing non-international armed conflict in South Sudan. As such, those crimes constitute violations of international humanitarian law under customary international law, as well as common article 3 to the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II, which is incorporated into domestic law through the Geneva Conventions Act, 2012. Those crimes may also amount to war crimes under articles 4 and 5 of the draft statute of the hybrid court for South Sudan. 102. The Commission finds reasonable grounds to believe that, in a number of instances, the attacks occurred as part of widespread or systematic attacks directed against the civilian population. As such, those alleged crimes may amount to crimes against humanity. A. Individual responsibility 103. In relation to the incidents examined, the Commission has been able to identify several commanders from SPLA, both factions of SPLA-IO and other armed groups as well as two governors of states and a country commissioner, in relation to whom there are reasonable grounds to believe that they exercised command or superior responsibility at the time that the violations and alleged crimes occurred. 13