A/HRC/11/10 page 10 28. According to a recent study by Centre Europe-Tiers Monde (CETIM), the implementation of conditionalities has a number of adverse consequences for the populations of the debtor countries: the privatization of public enterprises often results in massive job retrenchments, thus depriving many of a living; a reduction of public expenditures for public services (such as education, health care and housing) and/or the introduction of user fees for access to these services, which tend to disproportionately affect the most vulnerable sectors of society (women, children, persons with disabilities and the poor); and an increase in poverty, inequality and unemployment.12 29. The Special Rapporteur on the right to health has expressed concern that, in many countries, user fees often exclude the poor and other marginalized groups from essential health-care services and that this may be inconsistent with the right to health.13 30. Debt repayments have also had a negative impact on the realization of the right to food. For example, in 2002, the Government of Malawi was forced to sell maize from its National Food Reserve Agency to raise funds to repay loans. Following a poor harvest that year, 7 million of a population of 11 million were left facing a serious food shortage.14 31. Developing countries�� gains from debt relief are further being undermined by the activities of speculative investors in the debt of distressed countries. These “vulture funds”, as they are known, purchase the debt of developing countries for a sum far less than the face value of the debt. They subsequently sue (usually when the target country has gained some savings from debt cancellation) to recover the full face value of the debt plus interest, penalties and legal costs.15 An example is the well-publicized case concerning Donegal International Limited and Zambia, which was heard in the British courts in 2007. Donegal International Limited purchased a Zambian sovereign debt from Romania in 1999 for a total value of US$ 3.2 million. The debt had a face value of US$ 30 million. The company then sued Zambia for a total of US$ 55 million which included interest, penalties, alleged damages and legal fees. It was ultimately awarded US$ 15 million by the British courts, an amount that a country which had just received debt 12 See M. Ozden, “Debt and Human Rights: Consequences for human rights of the debt of the countries of the South and the current state of its treatment within the United Nations bodies”, (Geneva, Human Rights Programme of the Europe-Third World Centre 2008). 13 See E/CN.4/2005/51/Add.2, pp. 49-50. 14 A. Pettifor, “Debt is still the lynchpin: the case of Malawi” (available at www.jubileeplus.org/opinion/debt040702.htm); cited in K. Raffer, “Debt Workout Mechanisms: Debt Arbitration”, paper presented at the Helsinki Process on Globalization and Democracy Meeting of Track 2 Global Economic Agenda, 25-27 March 2004, Geneva, p. 11. 15 See Eurodad, “Taming the Vultures: Are New Measures Enough to Protect Debt Relief Gains?” (August 2008).

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