A/HRC/5/3 page 11 15 lead to eradication of extreme poverty. In his first report, the independent expert stated, “if the obligation of poverty eradication is derived from the instrumental role of human rights, then even if the latter are realized, there may be other factors or instrumental variables that prevent poverty eradication, and human rights obligations for state agencies and the international community would not necessarily entail policies to tackle those other instrumental variables”. However, if the eradication of poverty is itself seen as a human rights entitlement, the state agencies and the international community would have the obligation to adopt appropriate policies to remove extreme poverty. This would include not only the enforcement of the relevant human rights instruments already recognized, but also, other causes and variables that contribute to the creation of extreme poverty. As several experts pointed out, the poverty reduction programme would then be not a matter of charity but of duty, including the possibility to claim rights through the legal system and courts. It would make a government’s intervention “justiciable”, in that “violation” of this right would have a potential cost for the government, as cases could be taken to courts. One expert, giving the consequentialist argument of the value addition of the human rights approach, stated that when the interventions involved in the application of instruments to reduce poverty are opposed by the rich, the adoption of extreme poverty as a denial or violation of human rights would help to overcome their resistance (a) by increasing the cost to the rich and powerful of opposing those interventions, thereby implying a change in opportunity sets; and (b) by convincing the rich of the desirability of reduction in the incidence of poverty, implying a change in the preference of the rich. Countries may adopt policies to resolve internal conflicts or to reduce extreme poverty, as would be required by an international convention, without becoming parties. However, the peer group effect may be a very relevant consideration for many countries as they would not wish to be isolated as the only country not having ratified such a convention. In fact, the value added to poverty reduction of the existence of an international convention increases as a function of the importance of peer group pressures, and of the strength of its monitoring and “naming and shaming” provisions upon parties. 21. The acceptance of extreme poverty as a denial of human rights would thus create an obligation for a society to act, provided that the fulfilment of those obligations is feasible. It should be possible to identify the person and institution who as duty-bearers can take actions to fulfil these obligations. In this context a “violator” would be anyone who could have taken such action but failed to do so, or who has acted in a manner that engenders or worsens extreme poverty. Consequently, this notion of extreme poverty would force duty-bearers to adopt adequate anti-poverty policies. 22. In identifying the violator, however, it is necessary to closely examine the policies for eradicating poverty. Certain policies can be described as the “technical type” - for example whether countries should have an employment-oriented policy focus, or have a minimum wages law and a policy on how they should reallocate public expenditure. The other type of policies may be called “institutional”, dealing with the creation of appropriate institutions for formulating, monitoring and implementing the policies. The technical aspects of pro-poor policies are unlikely to differ much whether or not poverty is conceptually linked to human rights. The real difference would lie in the institutional aspect. The independent expert suggested 15 See E/CN.4/2005/49, p. 10, para. 28.