A/HRC/37/72 B. Schools 76. Between September and December 2017, as Government ground forces in Aleppo and Hamah advanced towards Idlib from the north, east and south, pro-Government forces concurrently launched a series of airstrikes against at least seven schools in the Aleppo countryside bordering Idlib. All but one attack were carried out at times when children were not present, evincing a pattern intended to decimate the structures and minimize civilian casualties. Affected schools were located in a militarily strategic area leading up to Abu alDuhur airbase and the railway connecting Aleppo and Damascus. After laying two years of siege, Jabhat al-Nusra militants and affiliates captured the Abu al-Duhur airbase from Government forces in September 2015.24 Details on the attacks against schools in Aleppo can be found in annex IV, paras. 7–18. The Commission has also documented attacks against schools in the context of the siege of eastern Ghutah by pro-Government forces (see annex II, paras. 20–23). C. Markets 77. The pattern of attacks affecting crowded market places continued during the reporting period.25 For example, on 13 November 2017, minutes after 2 p.m., a series of airstrikes hit the main market as well as surrounding houses and the Free Syrian police station in Atarib (Aleppo). The airstrikes killed at least 84 people, including 6 women and 5 children, and injured another 150 or so. The impacted site was located in a densely civilianpopulated area. In addition to shops, restaurants, commercial offices and family homes, two schools operated nearby (see annex IV, paras. 19–31 for details). 78. Information available indicates that the strikes were conducted by a Russian fixedwing aircraft using unguided weapons, including blast weapons. The use of such weapons in a densely civilian-populated area was certain to impact civilians. Some interviewees claimed that there had been ongoing infighting between Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham and Nour al-Din al-Zenki in western Aleppo governorate. The Commission also received conflicting information about a possible target. 79. All parties in a conflict must distinguish between legitimate military targets, on the one hand, and civilians and civilian objects, on the other, and use methods or means of combat that are directed at a specific military objective. There is no evidence to indicate that the above-mentioned attack deliberately targeted civilians or the Atarib market. However, the use of unguided bombs, including blast weapons, in a densely civilian populated area may amount to the war crime of launching indiscriminate attacks resulting in death and injury to civilians. X. Recommendations 80. In addition to the recommendations made below, the Commission reiterates the recommendations made in its previous reports. 81. The Commission recommends that parties to the conflict in both their conduct in military operations and their role as negotiating parties: (a) End violations against the civilian population, including summary executions, hostage-taking, arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, torture, and sexual and gender-based violence; (b) Disclose the locations of all places of detention, whether they are official, secret and/or makeshift, as well as provide complete lists identifying all detainees; 24 25 See A/HRC/31/68, para. 107. See A/HRC/28/69, annex II, paras. 2–8; A/HRC/30/48, paras. 34–35; and A/HRC/31/68, para. 77. 17