A/HRC/24/59 population. These checkpoints constituted a serious impediment to the free movement of goods and persons. VI. Violations of international law committed from 24 March to 11 July 2013 51. During the period under review, the former regime’s armed forces, the FACA, had not been dismantled, and Séléka soldiers had not yet participated in a disarmament, demobilization and reintegration process (which explains why they are still referred to in the present report as “the FACA” and “the Séléka”). Since 24 March 2013, however, Séléka soldiers have taken on the role of a national defence and security force under the command of the President and the Minister for Defence of the Central African Republic, Mr. Djotodia. All acts and decisions of civil authorities and of the Séléka therefore engage the responsibility of the State. A. Summary executions and extrajudicial killings 52. Several witnesses accused the Séléka of committing summary executions and extrajudicial killings. Some killings targeted soldiers from the FACA and the Presidential Guard, while others were committed in retaliation against perceived resistance from civilians. On 13 April 2013, in Ngaragba vicinity (7th district of Bangui), a Séléka vehicle struck and injured three individuals during a funeral procession, prompting residents to stage a protest. Soldiers surrounded the area and shot at protesters, killing two. On 15 April, the Séléka shot and killed, in the 4th district of Bangui, two motorcycle taxi drivers who had refused to surrender their vehicles. Some killings were committed without motive, such as the killing, in April 2013, in Ngouma (80 km from Mbaïki) of a pygmy father and his two young sons, and of three other pygmies in Ndongo and Mangongi regions. B. Enforced and involuntary disappearances 53. The mission received information on a number of cases involving the disappearance of soldiers of the FACA and the Presidential Guard, as well as individuals in many towns and villages across the country, after they were arrested in streets, at their homes or at random checkpoints. 54. Consistent and corroborated information received by the mission indicates that persons were arrested on the basis of information on the victims’ financial situation or political and ethnic affiliation provided to the Séléka by informants. The Séléka reportedly targeted neighbourhoods viewed as pro-Bozizé, particularly Boy-Rabe and Fouh neighbourhoods in Bangui, where a significant number of disappearances were reported. 55. The Séléka reportedly orchestrated scenarios to arrest people. Family members of victims interviewed by the mission stated that victims would usually receive a telephone call from a friend or acquaintance that they went to meet before disappearing. C. Arbitrary arrest and detention 56. The mission conducted dozens of interviews, including with detainees, their families and witnesses in Bangui and several prefectures who reported cases of arbitrary arrest and detention by the Séléka during the seizure of Bangui, which escalated in the following weeks and continued. Victims included judges, lawyers, members of the FACA, former 12