A/HRC/18/53 and local notables notwithstanding, resentment is all the stronger given that Sunnis account for some 70 to 75 per cent of the population, and the Alawites 10 per cent. 25. Initial protests in Dar’a and elsewhere were local responses to specific abuses of power by Syrian officials against the general backdrop of growing economic and political discontent. The partly successful uprisings in other countries in the Middle East provided inspiration and hope, but the non-participatory and highly repressive nature of the Government made it that much harder for people to voice their grievances. Syrians still remember the shelling of Hama in 1982 by security forces, which led to the killing of between 5,000 and 10,000 people.17 In the absence of legalized opposition parties and independent organizations, discontent was channelled through informal networks and in semi-private contexts. Electronic means of communication and social media also played an important role despite the authorities’ efforts to shut them down. Opposition conferences held in June and July 2011 in Antalya and Istanbul, Turkey, revealed tensions between different groups both inside and outside the country. The convening of another conference by key opposition figures in Damascus, in late June 2011, tolerated by the authorities, was contested by some of the younger activists within local coordination committees. 26. Over several weeks, cautious protests that began in marginalized regions developed into a countrywide uprising. The spread of protests and growing demands – for dignity and reforms, then for the departure of the President – seemed to reflect the failure of a policy combining harsh repression with tardy political concessions. 27. The lifting of the state of emergency was immediately followed by the shooting of peaceful protestors, which continued even as the Government-sponsored national dialogue conference was being held in July 2011; the conference was thus boycotted by the opposition. E. Military and security forces implicated in human rights violations since mid-March 2011 28. Both the armed forces and the security forces have been involved in the suppression of peaceful protests and related violations across the Syrian Arab Republic. The civilian police have also been deployed in urban areas for the purposes of crowd control. In addition, an Alawite civilian militia known as the Shabbiha participated in the commission of abuses against civilians.18 According to multiple accounts obtained by the mission, foreign fighters had been present and active during operations in several locations.19 1. Armed forces 29. All three corps of the Syrian army20 are said to have been deployed as support for the security forces in quelling protests since mid-March 201121 and to have participated in attacks on anti-Government protests. Witness accounts indicate that the armed forces 17 18 19 20 21 8 See Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime, Human Rights Watch, Yale University Press, 1991, pp. 19-21. There are conflicting accounts regarding the origin of the word Shabbiha. Witnesses claimed that, during raids on mosques and other public places, they heard a foreign language being spoken by some of the armed groups fighting alongside Syrian security forces. Some witnesses did not recognize the language, while others thought it may have been Farsi. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, the Syrian army is estimated at 220,000, including conscripts, with an additional 280,000 reserves. These figures exclude the Air Force, Air Defence and the Navy. Including the Fourth Armoured Division of the First Corps.