A/HRC/18/53 74. Consistent with an apparent shoot-to-kill policy, most of the bullet wounds found in victims were in the head, chest and general upper body area. Interviews were conducted with a number of former soldiers who had deserted the army, the police and different branches of the security forces. They claimed that they had received clear orders to use live ammunition against protestors.68 Those who refused to shoot civilians were shot from behind by other security officers and Shabbiha units. An analysis by the mission’s public order expert of video footage showing security operations revealed the lack of training in riot control by most of the forces deployed against civilians. This was compounded by weaponry that facilitated the excessive use of force against civilians. 75. On the ground, officers often fired indiscriminately at civilians, at close range and without warning.69 Many children and women were killed. In only a few demonstrations were non-lethal methods used: tear gas, water cannon and the firing of live ammunition into the air. Some of the demonstrations involved the indiscriminate use of rapid and intense ammunition fire at the same time as, or shortly after, the use of tear gas. Corroborative reports from different regions indicate that soldiers deserted after being ordered to fire on peaceful civilians.70 76. Witnesses attested to the use of tanks, heavy machine guns mounted on antipersonnel carriers and helicopters in urban areas. Security forces also used rocket-propelled grenades and grenade launchers mounted on AK47s against civilians in other areas. 77. Summary executions were also reported outside the context of demonstrations. For example, on 1 May, in Dar’a, it is alleged that some 26 men were blindfolded and summarily shot at the football stadium, which had been transformed into the local security forces headquarters. Executions were also reported during the sieges of cities and house-tohouse searches.71 78. Given that it was not permitted to visit the country, the mission was unable to verify repeated allegations that civilians were routinely and summarily executed in hospital (or make-shift hospital) beds by security forces. However, it was widely reported that forces conducted regular raids in hospitals to search for and kill injured demonstrators. The mission observed a high and consistent degree of fear among civilians of going to hospitals, with many preferring to remain untreated rather than risk being captured and killed. 79. There was a clear pattern of snipers shooting at demonstrators,72 including reports that officers were specially trained to deal with civilian demonstrations. Buildings where snipers were positioned included premises belonging to the security forces, Government or Baath party buildings, and mosques. In most cases, no warnings were given before opening fire. In some instances, snipers apparently even targeted people trying to evacuate the wounded. 68 69 70 71 72 Witness stated that the orders at Saraqeb, and near the camp of the Youth of the Baath Party in Al Mastuma, were given on 20 May 2011, when security forces opened fire at demonstrators as soon as they arrived, killing more than 40 people. Early on when the protests began, instances were reported of attempted negotiation by security or military personnel seeking to disperse the crowds. In most cases, such attempts were brief. As the situation on the ground worsened, such tactics gave way to direct attacks with live ammunition. Many of these soldiers were shot dead immediately upon breaking ranks during demonstrations, and some were killed or treated inhumanely for being suspected of disloyalty towards the Government. Including at Dar’a, Al Ladhiqiyah, Hamah and Jisr Al Shughour. For example, in Dar’a, Jisr Al Shughour, Banias, Al Ladhiqiyya and Duma. 21