A/HRC/18/53 the Constitution13 reflects the predominance of some Baathist military and security officers and their families, members of the ruling group frequently sideline formal hierarchies through informal chains of command. The presidential family and most of the officers belong to the Alawite minority, which, prior to urbanization, was concentrated in the northwest of the country. 21. Since the 1990s in particular, the Government has been in an alliance of sorts with businesses that were among the principal beneficiaries of economic reforms that emphasized private sector growth. Economic liberalization and growth led to a growing gap between rich and poor, despite the rhetoric about a “social market economy”. This was compounded by cuts in social services and subsidies, severe droughts, the rise in global food prices and the negative effects of the recent global financial crisis on remittances received from Syrians working abroad. Structural shortcomings of the economy were never seriously addressed by the Government. 22. For over four decades, the situation in the country has been characterized by gross human rights violations under the cloak of emergency legislation, in force since 1963. Syrians suffered arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions, prolonged detention without trial or unfair trials before exceptional or military courts, torture and ill-treatment resulting in deaths in custody, forced disappearances and summary executions.14 The rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly have been systematically violated. The brutality of the country’s security forces is notorious, and a number of the security and intelligence agencies act as independent entities and are involved in matters beyond their official functions. They enjoy immunity from prosecution by law (see paragraph 19 above). 23. When Bashar Al Assad succeeded his father as President in July 2000, hopes were raised that a series of reforms outlined in his inaugural speech, delivered on 17 July 2000, might result in greater political freedoms and civil rights. Debate on possible reforms was tolerated to a limited extent, but was short-lived and the crackdown on political and human rights activists resumed. Promised reforms did not materialize over the next decade.15 Some of these proposals were resurrected after protests that erupted in March 2011 galvanized anti-Government sentiment nationally and developed into a significant threat to the State. 24. Economic grievances were particularly strong in traditionally poor areas, including the north-eastern and border areas, such as Dar’a. They also reinforced long-standing issues of discrimination and neglect suffered by specific ethnic and religious groups, notably the Kurds, who inhabit the north-east and who, until March 2011, were deprived of basic civil, economic and social rights.16 Sunnis often consider themselves marginalized by rulers, who are overwhelmingly Alawites. Various alliances between the rulers and Sunni entrepreneurs 13 14 15 16 Promulgated by the previous President Hafez Al Assad, father of the current President. These violations have been extensively documented over the years by international non-governmental organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, and by the own monitoring mechanisms of the United Nations, including treaty bodies and special procedures of the Human Rights Council. A number of Syrian human rights groups have also documented many of these violations, including the Syrian Committee for Human Rights. See “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VI): The Syrian People’s Slow-motion Revolution”, International Crisis Group, Middle East/North Africa Report No.108, 6 July 2011; and “Popular Protest in North Africa and the Middle East (VII): The Syrian Regime’s Slow-motion Suicide”, Middle East/North Africa Report No.109, 13 July 2011. Kurds living in the Syrian Arab Republic have been deprived of Syrian nationality since 1962, as have their descendants. Their statelessness has given rise to other problems relating to personal status and an inability to seek employment in the public sector. They have also been denied basic social and cultural rights. See CRC/C/15/Add.212. 7