A/HRC/25/50 rights”. As several studies and the concluding observations of the various treaty bodies indicate, excessive foreign debt burdens constitute an obstacle to the enjoyment of human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights. 8. Secondly, these contentions are inconsistent with the spirit and purport of General Assembly resolution 60/251 establishing the Human Rights Council and the commitments which candidate States for membership of the Council make. In resolution 60/251, the Assembly recognized “the importance of ensuring universality, objectivity and nonselectivity in the consideration of human rights issues, and the elimination of double standards and politicization” and decided that the work of the Council should “be guided by the principles of universality, impartiality, objectivity and non-selectivity, constructive international dialogue and cooperation, with a view to enhancing the promotion and protection of all human rights, civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development”. It should also be noted that members of the Council are required to “fully cooperate with the Council”. 9. Thirdly, as the report of the independent expert assessing the human rights impact of international debt relief initiatives shows (A/HRC/23/37), the “[r]ules other than human rights law”4 and “other international fora which are much better equipped to deal with the questions of foreign debt and debt forgiveness” (presumably, the international financial institutions and the Paris Club5) have thus far failed to deliver an equitable and enduring solution to the sovereign debt problem. As creditors, these institutions cannot realistically be expected to focus on finding a solution to the debt crisis that prioritizes social and economic justice over debt repayment.6 It is also notable that these institutions have neither a human rights mandate nor the expertise to properly factor human rights into their policies and programmes. Furthermore, the “[r]ules other than human rights law” afford no protection for States that face debt repayment difficulties as is the case with individuals and entities in comparable situations under national insolvency laws,7 nor do they acknowledge or address the unjust or odious circumstances in which some of the sovereign debt was incurred. 10. Fourthly, the various United Nations human rights treaty bodies have recognized the adverse impacts of high debt burdens and related economic adjustment programmes on the realization of human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural rights.8 They have 4 5 6 7 8 Ibid. The Paris Club is an informal group of creditor countries which serves as a forum for renegotiating official sector debts (that is, debts that have been issued, insured or guaranteed by creditor governments) owed to its members. Its permanent members are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and United States of America. Other creditors are allowed to participate in negotiations on an ad hoc basis. See http://www.clubdeparis.org/en. For example, it has been asserted that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund “helped to create the very situation of indebtedness that they themselves had responsibility for fixing”. (Luke Fletcher and Adele Webb, Alternatives to Debtors Prison: Developing a Framework for International Insolvency,” Policy Paper by Jubilee Australia (October 2011), p. 19, available from www.acfid.asn.au/resources-publications/publications/acfid-research-in-development-series. See, for example, K. Raffer, “Internationalizing US municipal insolvency: a fair, equitable, and efficient way to overcome a debt overhang”, Chicago Journal of International Law, vol. 6, No. 1 (2005), pp. 361-379. See the following concluding observations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: E/C.12/1/Add.106 (Zambia); E/C.12/1/Add.78 (Benin); E/C.12/Add.71 (Algeria); E/C.12/1/Add.66 (Nepal); E/C.12/1/Add.63 (Syrian Arab Republic); E/C.12/1/Add.62 (Senegal); E/C.12/1/Add.60 (Bolivia, Plurinational State of); E/C.12/1/Add.57 (Honduras); E/C.12/1/Add.55 (Morocco); 5