A/HRC/42/42 directly employed by the company. Another international extractive company, however, informed the Working Group that it prefers to employ in-house security directly, both as a means to strengthen its relations with local communities living near its extractive projects and to have direct control over its private security personnel. 30. This also points to the awareness of some extractive companies of the reputational risks associated with allegations of misconduct and abuses by security providers operating in and around their sites. In some instances, extractive companies are more inclined to rely on their own employees or contractors than on State security forces in order to maintain direct influence and control over conduct by means of company policies and regulations, contracts, training and direct reporting lines. Moreover, extractive companies are likely to carefully weigh how to engage with State security forces in contexts where these forces have been accused of committing human rights violations. The reality of managing security in complex situations therefore presents sensitive challenges to extractive companies. 31. The Working Group received information suggesting that, in the context of mixed security arrangements at extractive sites, State security forces would normally be tasked with discharging major security operations, such as managing security during large-scale protests and demonstrations. In some countries, such as Ghana, where private security personnel are prohibited from carrying firearms (see A/HRC/39/49/Add.1), extractive companies rely on public forces in the event of serious security incidents. Some States have also established specialized units within the national police that are dedicated to protecting extractive and other large-scale projects.23 While States have a duty to maintain public peace and order throughout their territory, including in locations near extractive operations, in some instances, the close association between State security forces and extractive companies raises questions about whose interest the public forces are defending. For example, the Working Group was informed that police personnel may be stationed within facilities belonging to an extractive company or that a police station was opened in a community as a result of the start of extractive operations in the area. 32. The line between public and private interests in the provision of security services to the extractive industry may be further blurred when State security agents perform public duties at one time and are permitted to work as private security personnel at another, in some cases reportedly keeping their uniforms and firearms (see A/HRC/7/7/Add.2). The contracting of police personnel to perform private security tasks is legal in some States, for example in Peru, where a large number of contracts between the national police and extractive companies has been documented. 24 Agreements of this type find their legal basis in the “extraordinary police services” that can be rendered by off-duty police personnel, pursuant to law No. 1267 on the National Police of Peru and related Decree 003-2017-IN.25 At other times, State security agents are said to receive payments in-kind from an extractive company.26 In one instance, a memorandum of understanding obtained by a nongovernmental organization included provisions for a mining company to provide police with fuel, vehicles, maintenance, a per diem and other types of monetary support, accommodation and meals, and administrative support.27 33. State security personnel “moonlighting” by working as private security guards in parallel to their public functions can lead to confusion over their respective roles and responsibilities, in particular with regard to the appropriate use of force.28 This also inevitably complicates attempts to clearly categorize security providers in the extractive industry, especially given that the nature and content of agreements between State security forces and 23 24 25 26 27 28 Nigel D. White and others, “Blurring Public and Private Security in Indonesia: Corporate Interests and Human Rights in a Fragile Environment”, Netherlands International Law Review, vol. 65, No. 2, 2018. EarthRights International, Informe: Convenios entre la Policía Nacional y las empresas extractivas en el Perú. Análisis de las relaciones que permiten la violación de los derechos humanos y quiebran los principios del Estado democrático de Derecho, 2019. See Jose Saldana Cuba and Jorge Portorcarrero Salcedo, “The Violence in Laws: The Use of Force and the Criminalization of Socio-Environmental protests in Peru”, Derecho PUCP, 2017, No.79. Submission by MiningWatch Canada. Ibid. Alan Bryden and Lucia Hernandez, “Addressing Security and Human Rights Challenges in Complex Environments”, Business and Human Rights Journal, vol. 1, p. 153. 9