A/HRC/22/59 III. Investigation and prosecution through the national justice systems of third States It is possible that crimes committed in Syria are investigated and prosecuted by third States according to applicable rules of international law. For those crimes, many States assert universal jurisdiction which means that they apply their national criminal law despite the absence of specific link to the offence such as territoriality or nationality of the author or the victim. However, this approach can only ensure accountability in a very limited way. Authors of crimes could only be prosecuted if they leave Syria. The identification of perpetrators and the carrying out of the investigation have proven to be extremely challenging in these cases due to the fact that the evidence as well as witnesses and victims are not present in the State that asserts jurisdiction. Accordingly, national prosecutions in third states cannot guarantee comprehensive accountability for crimes in Syria but only supplement other efforts in a selective way. IV. Investigation and prosecution by an internationalized or international ad hoc tribunal The international community has set up or helped to set up a number of ad hoc tribunals, including the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC, “Khmer Rouge Tribunal”). An important advantage of such tribunals is that they can be tailored to meet the specific challenges and needs of the situation. While the ICTY and the ICTR were essentially imposed, the other tribunals mentioned above were created with significant participation of the respective countries which increases ownership of victims. The geographical presence of a tribunal in the concerned State can also improve positive perception by affected societies. A significant inconvenience of ad hoc tribunals is that a highly complex institution has to be created from scratch. Defining a sound legal framework, finding appropriate facilities, recruiting competent personnel or ensuring cooperation of States represent considerable challenges, require time and are likely to be more costly than if a permanent institution is tasked with investigation and prosecution. Furthermore, when financial contributions by States are not compulsory as in the case of the ICTY and the ICTR, long-term funding is extremely difficult to secure. The SCSL, the STL and the ECCC, for instance, are currently under great financial pressure. Financial constraints on ad hoc tribunals are of significant concern because they drastically undermine the ability to effectively and independently provide justice for victims. The example of the ECCC is also instructive because it shows that internationalized structures which are integrated in the national justice system are exposed to a considerable risk of undue influencing which impedes the impartial delivery of justice. Finally, security concerns have often led the creators of ad hoc tribunals to establish them (at least partially) abroad, which limits the positive “ownership-effect” of ad hoc tribunals described above. What the situation in Syria at the present time is concerned, it is difficult to conceive an internationalized ad hoc tribunal that is integrated in the national judicial system. Given the apparent lack of willingness and capability to execute investigations and prosecution described in paragraph 2, it is unrealistic to assume that Syria would support the establishment of such a tribunal let alone fully respect its independence. The dire security situation rules out the presence of such a mechanism in Syria. An international ad hoc GE.13-10627 125