A/HRC/22/59 24. Despite multiple endeavours to unify and structure its ranks, the armed opposition remained fragmented and unable to designate a reliable leadership. This fragmentation was aggravated by — if not the result of — the fact that the financial and material external support delivered by different sponsors, instead of promoting integration, has generated divisions and exacerbated competition among different groups. 25. The FSA has remained a brand name only, despite efforts of its leadership and supporters to create a central command and to link it to regional and local military councils. Meanwhile, there are also independent military alliances, which vary from more moderate to more extreme groups, which have managed to integrate several armed groups in specific circumstances and areas. The differences between the self-identified FSA and independent groups have not, however, significantly hindered their cooperation as they have continued to cooperate operationally to achieve their common objectives. 26. The intervention of external sponsors has contributed to the radicalization of the insurgency as it has favoured Salafi4 armed groups such as the al-Nusra Front, and even encouraged mainstream insurgents to join them owing to their superior logistical and operational capabilities. The support provided by external sources usually depends on the operational effectiveness of the groups and their willingness to embrace the language and symbols of their sponsors. 27. The number of foreign fighters has increased, but still accounts for a small proportion of the ranks of anti-Government armed groups. Their expertise and experience in insurgency warfare has been important to the opposition’s tactical effectiveness. They are drawn from countries in the Middle East, North Africa and Central Asia, with many from Libya, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq and Egypt. 28. Anti-Government armed groups have improved their access to weaponry, albeit unequally. Besides the military equipment looted from army bases, weapons and ammunition have also been provided by external sources and smuggled in across borders with neighbouring countries in significant quantities and on an increasingly regular basis. 3. Other forces 29. Tensions between anti-Government armed groups and Kurdish militia mainly affiliated to the Democratic Union Party have increased in the predominantly Kurdish areas. After capturing most of the Kurdish towns without major resistance, the new Kurdish Popular Protection Units have periodically clashed with anti-Government armed groups owing to the latter’s unwanted intrusion into what they consider to be their territory. C. Socioeconomic and humanitarian situation5 30. The conflict has wrought havoc on the economic, social and cultural rights of Syrians. The destruction of infrastructure, housing, medical facilities, schools, power and water utilities exacerbates pre-existing hardships, pushing whole communities to the brink of collapse. 31. The onset of severe winter conditions, coupled with a growing displaced population and increasing difficulty in the delivery of humanitarian relief — including food, medical supplies and fuel — was cause for grave concern. In urban centres, the risk of epidemics 4 5 8 Salafi refers to a wide range of groups who adopt a literal view of Sunni canonical texts. In the Syrian Arab Republic, it often denotes groups who use this interpretation to promote a militant activism against a ruling establishment deemed non-Islamic. See also annex III. GE.13-10627